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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Recent academic studies indicate that corporate divestitures generate considerable shareholder 
wealth. The field is emerging as an important topic in the finance, strategy and organizational 
literature, but the understanding of what determines these gains remains somewhat fragmented 
and inconsistent. This thesis contributes to this understanding by specifically studying the 
effect of firm size on seller announcement abnormal return. We use a sample of 6699 
divestitures completed by 2350 different sellers in the United States between 1995 and 2014 
and conclude that small sellers outperform large sellers by an average of 1.96% at the 
announcement of divestitures. The size effect is robust to a wide range of firm and deal 
characteristics introduced by the literature. We propose that the size effect could be explained 
by greater idiosyncratic risk associated with the divestiture announcement by small sellers.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A divestiture is the sale of a portion of the firm’s assets in a private transaction (Eckbo 
& Thorburn, 2013). During the last 20 years, almost 15.000 divestitures were completed by 
public US corporations, generating in excess of $269 billion to its shareholders1.  Despite the 
considerable shareholder gain, executives often have a hard time letting go or are simply too 
busy doing acquisitions (McKinsey & Company, 2015). The reward is not automatic, and often 
involves large costs and painful organizational restructuring (Bain & Company, 2014). 
Naturally, the field is emerging as an important topic in different research areas, but the 
understanding of what determines the wealth creation is still limited (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). 
This paper attempts, in all modesty, to contribute to the understanding of these determinants 
by specifically investigating the effect of the size of the seller on announcement abnormal 
returns. 
This paper investigates a sample of 6699 divestitures completed by 2350 different 
public corporations in the United States between 1995 and 2014. On average, shareholders of 
selling firms gain 1.25% on the announcement of a divestiture and small sellers outperform 
large sellers by 1.96%. We examine possible reasons for this difference by drawing on research 
in both the divestiture and acquisition literature. We find that the size effect is not explained 
by (1) relative deal size, (2) increase in focus, (3) operational fit with the buyer, (4) agency 
cost of holding cash, (5) financial distress (6) divestiture experience, or (7) partial anticipation. 
Hence, we conclude that firm size is an important determinant for value creation in divestitures 
and that further work is required to fully understand the reasons for this effect.  
We believe this paper contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, we find 
that the size effect in divestiture is robust to a wide variety of characteristics believed to have 
impact on abnormal return. Second, it provides an updated look at announcement abnormal 
return generated from divestitures. Third, it tests existing hypotheses in the divestiture 
literature using a bigger and updated dataset. Lastly, it proposes and tests new hypotheses to 
explain value creation in divestiture inspired by theories in the acquisition literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of divestitures. 
Section 3 provides an overview of existing literature pertaining to divestitures and establishes 
a set of hypotheses to explain the size effect. In section 4 we describe the dataset and briefly 
discuss key methodology and limitations in the data. Section 5 is divided into 2 stages. Stage 
1 offers key descriptive statistics to get an indication of the relationships proposed by the 
hypotheses. Stage 2 discusses the key findings from the empirical analysis. Lastly, we 
introduce two alternative explanations for the size effect in section 6.   
                                                 
1 From SDC and CRSP adjusted for inflation  
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2. BACKGROUND  
 
This section provides an introduction to divestitures. First, we discuss the concept of 
divestitures in the context of the broader mergers and acquisition field. Second, we briefly 
review existing literature studying the wealth creation from divestitures. In section 3, we dive 
deeper into the determinants of this wealth creation.    
 
2.1 DIVESTITURES IN THE M&A CONTEXT 
 
Eckbo & Thorburn (2013) define a divestiture as the sale of a portion of the firm’s 
assets in a private transaction. Often being the counterpart to an acquisition, divestitures are 
different from other transactions in the sense that the parent continues to exist as a separate 
entity. The assets range in types and sizes, and could be a division, segment, subsidiary or a 
product line. Typically the seller receives cash, but could also receive securities as payment 
either in full or in parts (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2013).  
Divestitures impact different stakeholders of the selling firm. By engaging in a 
divestiture, the value of stocks and bonds outstanding are typically affected (Datta et al., 2003), 
whilst customers, employees and suppliers face increased uncertainty about the future (Gole 
& Hilger, 2008). Divestitures also have a significant economic impact. For example, Gole & 
Hilger (2008) found that the total value of all divestitures with an announced price amounted 
to $342 billion in the United States between 2002 and 2006, averaging $175 million per deal. 
Furthermore, the total number of divestitures totaled over 16 000, representing over a third of 
all M&A transactions.    
        Although divestitures is a theoretically and practically interesting field, it is often 
treated as the smaller cousin of corporate restructuring (Brauer, 2006). Our interests lie mainly 
in the field of portfolio restructuring, which encompasses divestitures, mergers, acquisitions 
and dissolutions. Corporate portfolio restructuring can also be thought of as the question of the 
economic boundary of the firm. Coase (1937) states that the ideal firm size is where the cost 
of arranging a marginal transaction on the market equals the marginal cost of arranging it 
within the firm. As the external environment of the firm changes, so does the optimal size of 
the firm leading to corporate portfolio restructuring. However, agency issues, regulation and 
creditor demands complicate the understanding. Managers could be motivated to divest to 
obtain cash to follow personal projects (Lang et al., 1995), obtain cash to pay back debt to 
creditors to avoid a future bankruptcy, or due to antitrust regulations.  
Divestitures are also often treated as the counterpart to mergers and acquisitions. 
Although every divestiture must have a buyer, it is qualitatively different from an acquisition. 
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Gole & Hilger (2008) describe that the average divestiture is more complicated managerially 
and psychologically, as selling is usually viewed as dead-end transactions accompanied with 
meticulous planning beforehand and substantial uncertainty for the employees. Managers of 
divestitures thus have a significant challenge in communicating and managing the process 
before the actual divestiture. A merger or an acquisition on the other hand is often marked by 
excitement, with the organizational challenges arising post-acquisition (Shrivastava, 1986). 
Another significant difference is that divestitures might be forced, either by creditors or 
competitive authorities whilst mergers and acquisitions typically are voluntary. 
Hamilton and Chow (1993) studied divestiture motivations by surveying 59 managers 
asking them to rank their objectives. The four most common objectives were (1) to discard 
unprofitable units, (2) to focus on core activities, (3) to meet corporate liquidity requirements 
and (4) to get a good price for the offered units. Interestingly these objectives correspond well 
to some of our hypotheses explored later, mainly corporate focus, buyer fit and financial 
distress.  
 
2.2 WEALTH CREATION FROM DIVESTITURES 
 
Figure 2.1  
Average seller cumulative abnormal return at the announcement of divestitures by year. The event 
window is (-1, 0). The data is collected from CRSP and SDC.  
 
 
The study of divestitures mainly revolves around the antecedents and the effect on the 
wealth of the various stakeholders. We are especially interested in the effect of a divestiture on 
the wealth of shareholders. Given the assumption that the market is semi-strong efficient, we 
assume that the announcement abnormal returns reflect the actual changes in wealth due to the 
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divestiture, given no information leakages. The literature uses different event windows to 
measure cumulative abnormal return in order to pick up any information leakage prior to the 
event. Figure 2.1 shows average cumulative abnormal return per year measured using a two-
day interval (-1, 0). Average abnormal return fluctuates around 1 percent and is positive in all 
years.   
Eckbo & Thorburn (2013) review numerous studies investigating the magnitude of 
abnormal announcement returns. They find that returns range from 0.3% to 3.4% in the period 
between 1963 and 2005, and almost all are significantly positive at the 1% significance level.  
They also report a sample-size-weighted-average of 1.2%. However, as the samples of the 
studies cited are concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s, the return is slightly biased towards the 
average return in the two decades. Furthermore there is also evidence that divestitures create 
value for the buyers. Eckbo & Thorburn (2013) review buyers of divested assets between 1963 
and 2002, and find a range from 0.0% to 2.3% with a sample-sized-weighted average abnormal 
return of 1.2%.  
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3. DETERMINANTS OF WEALTH CREATION  
 
The main objective of this paper is to explore determinants of wealth creation in 
divestitures, and in particular, determine the effect of firm size.  We approach this objective by 
first investigating whether a size effect exists. Next, we explore whether the size effect, if any, 
can be explained by existing theories drawn from the divestiture research. In this section we 
review the literature and derive a set of hypotheses that will form the basis for our analysis. In 
particular, we explore the concepts relative deal size, corporate focus, operational fit with the 
buyer, agency issues of holding cash, inter-temporal effects and financial distress. In the 
following sections we discuss these topics in turn. 
 
3.1 FIRM SIZE 
 
ABSOLUTE SIZE 
Firm size is often used to control for and explain acquisition returns. Moeller et al. 
(2004) conducted a large-sample study documenting a size effect in acquisitions. Later studies 
seeking to explain acquirer returns frequently use firm size as a moderator for acquisition 
returns, with significant explanatory effect (Golubov et al., 2015 and Moeller et al., 2005). 
Although explanatory factors such as managerial hubris and acquisition premium has been 
attributed to the size effect, it remains a significant explanatory variable for acquisition returns 
and a “fertile area for acquisition research” (Haleblian et al, 2009). 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical work has explored whether a similar size 
effect exists in divestitures. We suspect that small sellers are inherently different from large 
sellers in aspects that affect wealth creation in divestitures, and consequently, that small sellers 
might outperform large sellers at the deal announcement. Hence, our first hypothesis is:     
 
Hypothesis 1: Small sellers outperform large sellers at the announcement of divestitures.  
 
In the following discussion we will derive new hypotheses assuming that hypothesis 1 is true. 
 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 
A natural explanation for a difference in wealth creation between small and large sellers 
is the relative size of the deal. The percentage abnormal return is a function of the absolute 
dollar gain and the pre-announcement market capitalization of the seller. Paralleling the 
intuition in acquisitions (Asquith et al, 1983), a large percentage abnormal return could be 
caused by a large deal value relative to the market capitalization of the seller, rather than a 
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larger value creation per dollar of deal value. Previous studies, including Zaima & Hearth 
(1985), Klein (1986) and Mulherin & Boone (2000), document a significant relative size effect 
on divestiture announcement returns.  
 Because small sellers typically divest assets with larger relative deal size than large 
sellers (see section 5.1.3), we hypothesize that relative deal size could explain some of the size 
effect. To determine whether the size effect is not only capturing the mechanical relationship 
between two variables, we examine whether the size effect is persistent when controlling for 
relative size.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The size effect is persistent when controlling for relative deal size  
 
Given that the size effect is not explained by relative size effect, we seek to explain the 
remaining effect by establishing hypotheses drawing on ideas from both the acquisition and 
divestiture literature.  
 
3.2 CORPORATE FOCUS 
 
 Numerous studies have pointed to corporate focus as a driver for wealth creation in 
divestitures. For instance John & Ofek (1995) find that 34% of all divesting firms in their 
sample decreased the number of segments in the year of the divestiture as compared to the 
previous year. The resulting increase in corporate focus is associated with wealth creation for 
the shareholders of the divesting firm. Several studies, such as John & Ofek (1995), Dittmar 
& Shivdasani (2003) and Berger & Ofek (1999) have all documented significant positive 
abnormal return for focus-increasing divestitures ranging from 1.5% to 3.4%. The literature 
presents two reasons for this wealth creation. Firstly, Linn & Michael (1984) argue that 
shareholder wealth is generated when management increases its attention on core business 
units. Secondly, John & Ofek (1995) argue that the increase in focus reduces the conglomerate 
discount of the parent firm. The following discussion centers on the conglomerate discount.  
There are costs and benefits associated with diversification, and the impact on value 
creation depends on the net sum of these effects. The literature proposes two main arguments 
for the benefits of diversification. Firstly, the information flows are more efficient intra-firm 
than inter-firm, and thus diversified firms might be able to allocate resources more efficiently 
than external capital markets (Weston, 1970). Secondly, by combining businesses with 
imperfectly correlated earning streams, diversified firms are able to borrow more due to the 
coinsurance created (Lewellen, 1971) and have a higher tax shield than non-diversified firms. 
Another tax advantage is that diversified firms might be able to match losses to earnings in the 
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same year the losses are made, creating an advantage over undiversified firms that would have 
to use carry-back or carry-forward provisions (Majd & Myers, 1987). 
Diversification also entails possible costs to the firm. Stultz (1990) argues that 
diversified firms tend to overinvest and cross-subsidize businesses with poor investment 
opportunities. A related argument to cross-subsidization made by Meyer & Roberts (1992) is 
that businesses that are part of a bigger firm can have a negative value for the firm, whilst 
operating as a stand-alone it cannot have a negative value for its stockholders. Lastly, as firms 
become more diversified, information asymmetries might arise between central managers and 
divisional managers translating into increased costs (see Myerson, 1982 and Harris et al., 
1982). 
The empirical evidence is mostly consistent with a conglomerate discount. For 
example, Berger & Ofek (1995) find a diversification discount between 13% and 15% by 
computing imputed stand-alone values for each of the segments of a diversified firm and Lang 
& Stulz (1994) find a diversification discount using imputed Tobin’s Q. We expect to observe 
a focus effect similar to that found by John & Ofek (1995). We also hypothesize that the focus-
effect is contingent on the size of the firm, where deals made by small sellers are more sensitive 
to an increase in focus than large firms. We build on previous work by Berger & Ofek (1995), 
who found that small firms with book assets under 50$ million had significantly larger 
diversification discounts than larger firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Increase in corporate focus due to an asset sale affects abnormal return 
positively.  
3.3 FIT WITH THE BUYER 
 
Another important driver for wealth creation in corporate divestitures is the selling of 
an asset to a buyer valuing the asset higher than the seller (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2013). For 
example, Hite et al. (1987) stressed that allocation of assets from a lower-valuing seller to a 
higher-valuing buyer is important for value-creation in corporate divestitures. In the 1990s, 
John & Ofek (1995) expanded the research by finding that seller abnormal returns were 1.8% 
higher for deals with an LBO group buyer. They also found that seller abnormal returns were 
5.0% higher for deals where the target’s industry affiliation is related to the buyer’s and not to 
the seller’s. These findings suggest that the seller announcement return is higher if the buyer 
has a comparative advantage in operating the asset, or if the seller has a comparative 
disadvantage in doing so. 
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 We expect to find that seller announcement return is positively related to a good 
operational fit between the buyer and the asset, and that buying LBO groups yield higher 
announcement abnormal returns for the seller.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Better fit between the asset and buyer leads to larger abnormal announcement 
return for the seller. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the literature does not provide any convincing arguments 
indicating that small sellers more often sell to higher-valuing buyers. However, a possible 
reason could be that divestitures by small sellers often involve managers sticking with the asset 
after the change in ownership. Given this agenda, they might be more personally motivated to 
sell to a buyer with better fit because his or her competences will be valued higher. On the 
contrary, key personnel in large selling firms might be more prone to stay with the parent firm 
and therefore have less personal interest in a “perfect” match with the buyer. This argument is 
speculative but plausible. If small sellers more often sell to higher valuing buyers, we 
hypothesize that this could explain why small firms have greater announcement abnormal 
return.  
3.4 AGENCY COSTS OF HOLDING CASH 
 
Now we turn to determinants of wealth creation in divestitures that center on corporate 
governance issues. In particular, we review literature studying agency costs of holding cash. 
We discuss the benefits of receiving cash proceeds from asset sales followed by the agency 
costs of holding cash and determinants for these costs.  
Numerous studies in the literature have discussed benefits of holding cash. Myers & 
Majluf (1984) and Bates (2005) contend that information asymmetries between shareholders 
and managers lead to underinvestment if the firm must issue equity. In addition, Myers (1977) 
introduced the problem of debt overhang and corresponding underinvestment if the firm cannot 
issue risk free debt. Building on these ideas, Lang et al. (1995) introduced the Financing 
Hypothesis arguing that firms are motivated to carry out asset-sales in order to obtain cash 
proceeds to circumvent the problems of raising outside funds.  
If the incentives of managers are not fully aligned with investors’, they might be 
motivated to conduct unprofitable investments and hence destroy shareholder value (Roll, 
1986). Thus, if the motivation to divest is to obtain cash, the impact on abnormal return can be 
both positive and negative depending on the level of agency issues in the firm. Several studies 
examined agency costs of holding cash. In particular, Jensen & Meckling (1976), Roll (1986), 
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that managers have incentives to grow the firm larger 
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than the optimal size by carrying out unprofitable investments and hence destroy shareholder 
value. As a result, excess free cash flow is only beneficial to shareholders if allocated 
optimally. Motivated by this discussion, Lang et al. (1995) examined the use of proceeds in 
151 asset sales and found that the stock price reaction to asset sales is significantly positive 
when the proceeds are used to pay down debt and negative if retained in the firm. They argue 
that for firms with agency costs of cash, the market interprets a decision to pay out proceeds 
positively because the alternative would imply that managers would spend it on negative NPV 
projects. 
So what determines the magnitude of agency costs of holding cash? Extensive literature 
investigates these determinants. Most notably, monitoring of management and management 
incentive programs are determinants that dominate the debate. For example, Agrawal & 
Mandelker (1987) find evidence in support of the hypothesis that executive holdings of 
common stock and options reduce the level of management discretion problems. Similarly, 
Tehranian et al. (1987) studied divestitures in particular and found that firms with long term 
executive compensation plans experience a significant positive announcement return whereas 
firms without such compensation plans experience insignificant negative announcement 
returns. Hirschey et al. (1989) find that divestiture announcement return is more favorable 
when the ownership is concentrated and significant insider trading activity has taken place 
prior to the deal. The importance of long-term executive compensation was confirmed in recent 
studies such as Atullah et al. (2010). They studied 2080 asset sales by UK firms between 1992 
and 2005 and found that CEO ownership and stock options are positively related to 
announcement returns when proceeds are retained but insignificant if paid out. 
As first documented in Jensen & Meckling (1976), shareholders are motivated to incur 
monitoring costs to limit divergences between shareholder and management interests. 
Likewise, Fama & Jensen (1983) contend that the separation of ownership and control in 
corporations survives partly due to an effective approach to monitor the behavior of 
management. Hirschey et al. (1990) examined the effect of banks as monitors of management 
activity on divestiture announcement return. They find that firms with high bank debt 
experience higher abnormal returns than firms with low bank debt. Interestingly, they find that 
leverage in general has no significant impact and conclude that the market regards the bank 
debt as different from other debt due to the monitoring function of banks. The results are 
similar to those found by Datta (2003) and Nguyen (2013).  
As implied by the financing hypothesis presented by Lang et al. (1995), the existence 
of agency issues will only destroy value in divestitures if the purpose of the asset sale was to 
obtain cash to finance sub-optimal projects. If the seller has a large cash reserve before the 
divestiture, we would not expect less managerial discretion to create value because it is less 
likely that the management wanted cash. Furthermore, if the seller is in financial distress, the 
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motivation to sell might be driven by pressure from creditors rather than by self-interested 
managers. Therefore, we argue that greater alignment of incentives only has a positive impact 
on abnormal return if the motivation to divest is to obtain cash, given that the firm is not in 
financial distress.   
 
Hypothesis 3c: Greater alignment of incentives and more bank monitoring will affect 
abnormal return positively if the firm is healthy and has low cash.  
 
If agency cost of holding cash explain the size effect in corporate divestitures, we would 
expect that they are more pertinent for large firms than for small firms. We argue that agency 
issues might be a bigger problem in large corporations than in small corporations. As argued 
by Moeller et al. (2004), executive incentives in small firms are generally better aligned with 
that of shareholders due to more executive ownership and longer-term compensation plans. In 
addition, as suggested by Demsetz & Lehn (1985), managers of large firms typically have more 
hubris because they are more important socially and face fewer obstacles due to greater 
financial capacity. Furthermore, small firms might have a higher share of private (bank) debt 
compared to large firms because large firms generally need more capital. Thus, we expect 
management in small firms to be better monitored by banks than in large firms.  
 
3.5 FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 
We define financial distress as a state in which the firm is in danger of not meeting its 
hard obligations (most usually debt repayments) either due to illiquidity or insolvency. When 
firms are financially distressed, creditors typically apply pressure on the firm to ensure 
repayment of its claims. Asquith et al. (1992) and Ofek (1993) show that firms in financial 
distress frequently divest or sell assets as a part of their restructuring process. The literature is 
divided in its conclusions concerning the effect of financial distress on announcement 
abnormal return of asset sales.   
Two main theories suggest that financial distress destroys wealth in divestitures. 
Firstly, Brown et al. (1994) argue that for firms with liquidation value of its assets below the 
face value of its liabilities, stockholders hold a call option that might potentially realize a profit 
in the future. If the assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to the creditors, this call options 
ceases to exist, which destroys value for the shareholders. Second, the firm might be forced to 
sell the asset at a discounted price. Shleifer & Vishny (1992) argue that financial distress often 
is an industry-wide phenomenon, forcing distressed firms to look for buyers in a different 
industry, which typically have lower best-value use of the asset. Eckbo & Thorburn (2008) 
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look at bankrupt firms in Sweden and find evidence of a discount when bankrupt firms are 
liquidated piece-wise, but not when the whole firm is sold as a going concern.  
In contrast to the above theories, some scholars argue that financial distress more often 
create wealth than destroy wealth in divestitures. Afshar et al. (1992) argue that by completing 
a successful sale, the firm might be able to avoid an expected costly bankruptcy, and thus signal 
good news to the market. In a similar vein, Brown et al (1994) argue that retention of proceeds 
from an asset sale signals that creditors’ have faith in the value of the remaining assets. 
Empirically, Afshar et al (1992) show that financially distressed firms in the UK 
display significantly larger abnormal returns than healthy firms on divestiture announcements, 
implying a larger signaling effect than value-destruction effect. We expect to observe the same 
tendency by sellers in the United States. Thus we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3d: Divestitures by firms in financial distress experience higher announcement 
abnormal returns than healthy firms.  
 
 We hypothesize that financial distress could explain some of the size effect because 
small firms are typically more often in distress2. Furthermore, financial distress might have a 
different effect depending on whether the divesting firm is small or large. We reason that 
asset sales by large distressed firms do not significantly reduce the risk of bankruptcy 
because the deal value is typically small relative to the size of the outstanding liabilities. In 
contrast, small sellers typically divest a larger share of their pre-deal market capitalization, 
which theoretically could reduce the bankruptcy risk significantly. 
 
3.6 INTER-TEMPORAL EFFECTS 
 
Now we draw inspiration from the acquisition literature, and discuss the effect of 
carrying out several successive asset sales on the wealth creation of the next asset sale. This is 
interesting to our study because large sellers typically make more asset sales than small sellers 
(see section 5.1.3). Specifically, we discuss CEO learning and decreasing marginal efficiency 
of subsequent deals. Both effects depend on previous deal behavior, and we thus group them 
collectively as inter-temporal effects. 
Literature dedicated to inter-temporal determinants of divestiture performance is 
scarce. However, recent studies in the acquisition literature have provided evidence of a 
declining cumulative abnormal return in the number of subsequent deals (see Billet & Qian, 
                                                 
2 Credit ratings and other financial distress measures are typically functions of firm size, implying that smaller 
firms have a higher probability of being in distress. 
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2008; Ismail, 2008; Fuller et al., 2002; Ahern, 2008). Different explanations have been 
suggested for this negative trend. For example Ismail (2008) points out that the declining trend 
supports Keynes’ Marginal Efficiency of Capital principal as the best investment opportunities 
are exploited first. The theory implies that the least profitable projects are left for the higher 
order deals and hence affect the later acquisitions negatively.  
Another explanation for the declining acquisition announcement return is Aktas et al.’s 
(2009) model of CEO learning. They argue that a rational CEO learn from the stock reaction 
of the previous acquisition announcement and adjusts his bidding behavior of the next 
prospective acquisition accordingly. A positive stock reaction in the first acquisition creates a 
positive signal to the CEO, making him bid more aggressively in the next deal and increase 
the bid premium. As a result, the acquirer abnormal return is expected to decline. Using an 
autoregressive approach, Aktas et al. (2011) empirically test the model and find that CEOs 
increase the bid premium if the stock reaction of the previous deal was positive (and vice 
versa). Moreover, they show that CEO acquisition experience increases the sensitivity of the 
learning effect so that more experienced CEOs make a more aggressive bid than less 
experienced CEO following a positive stock reaction. To control for the existence of CEO 
hubris (see Billet & Qian, 2008; Ismail, 2008), Aktas et al. (2011) study the interaction between 
net insider stock purchases by the CEO prior to the deal and investor reactions at earnings 
announcements (similar approach as Billet & Qian, 2008). They find that CEOs learn from 
previous stock reactions regardless of whether the CEO is hubristic or rational. 
The idea of CEO learning presented by Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2011) may also be 
applied to divestitures. This plausibility was confirmed by talking to Professor Eric de Bodt in 
October 2015. We argue that CEOs of frequently divesting firms also learn from the stock 
reaction of the previous asset sale; CEOs consider the stock reaction of the previous asset sales 
and accept a lower bid premium if the previous reaction was positive which lowers the 
abnormal return but also increases the likelihood of a new deal taking place. In addition, a CEO 
of a divesting firm may be more eager to approach potential buyers if he has received a positive 
signal on the prior sale. We would therefore expect the announcement abnormal return of 
selling firms to decline in the subsequent order of divestitures. Moreover, we apply the 
marginal efficiency argument developed by Keynes to divestitures and expect that abnormal 
return will decline with deal order because assets with the highest transaction value relative to 
internal valuation are divested first. 
 
Hypothesis 3e: Announcement abnormal return of selling firms decline in the firm’s deal order 
number.   
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As larger firms tend to do more divestitures, we expect inter-temporal effects to be 
more pertinent to larger firms. Given that the abnormal return for selling firms is declining 
with deal order, deals made by large firms should on average underperform those of smaller 
firms. Thus, we expect that the deal order number contributes to the size effect.  
 
3.7 THE SIZE EFFECT 
 
 Section 3.1 to 3.6 derived a set of hypotheses to explain announcement abnormal 
returns in divestitures using existing literature. To investigate whether a size effect exists, we 
test whether the effect of firm size on abnormal return is persistent after controlling for all 
other determinants introduced in the literature. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The size effect is persistent after controlling for relative deal size, corporate 
focus, buyer fit, agency issues, financial distress and firm deal order.  
 
3.8 HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Small sellers outperform large sellers at the announcement of divestitures.  
Hypothesis 2: The size effect is persistent when controlling for relative deal size  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Increase in corporate focus due to an asset sale affects abnormal return 
positively.  
Hypothesis 3b: Better fit between the target and buyer leads to larger abnormal 
announcement return for the seller. 
Hypothesis 3c: Greater alignment of incentives and more bank monitoring will affect 
abnormal return positively if the firm is healthy and has low cash.  
Hypothesis 3d: Divestitures by firms in financial distress experience higher announcement 
abnormal returns than healthy firms.  
Hypothesis 3e: Announcement abnormal return of selling firms decline in the firm’s deal 
order number.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The size effect is persistent after controlling for relative deal size, corporate 
focus, buyer fit, agency issues, financial distress and firm deal order.  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To analyze determinants of shareholder gains in divestitures we obtained data from the 
Thomson Financial SDC database, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
COMPUSTAT. This section seeks to (1) describe the procedures used to construct the sample, 
(2) present key variables used in the thesis and (3) outline limitations and econometric 
assumptions. 
 
4.1 THE SAMPLE 
 
The sample was constructed by selecting all completed mergers and acquisitions in the 
SDC database with announcement dates between 1995 and 2014 and deal size greater than $1 
million. The deal value is defined by SDC as the total consideration paid by the acquirer, 
including fees. We then identified a divestiture, also referred to as an asset sale, if the 
transaction satisfied the following criteria: 
 
1.   The transaction is flagged as “divestiture” in the SDC database; 
2.   The immediate or ultimate parent of the target has minimum 50 percent ownership prior 
to the announcement date; 
3.   The acquirer ownership post transaction is higher than 50 percent; 
 
The above selection excludes spin-offs, equity carve-outs and recapitalizations. Next, 
we identify the divesting firm, hereafter referred to as the “seller”. If both the immediate parent 
and the ultimate parent are public, the immediate parent is identified as the seller. If only one 
is public, the respective public parent is identified as the seller. Having identified the seller in 
each divestiture we further reduce the sample applying the subsequent criteria: 
 
1.   The nationality of the seller is US 
2.   The seller is public 
3.   Information on stock prices of the seller is available in the CRSP database 
4.   The seller is non-financial3  
 
                                                 
3 SIC codes in the range 60-67 
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Table 4.1 
Data population and sample selection in the period 2005 to 2014. Appendix 9.2 provides data for the 
entire sample period between 1995 and 2014.  
Year   
Total 
transactions Divestitures US divestitures Public US divestitures Sample 
Sample/Total 
divestitures 
2005   11927 3952 1327 802 392 9.9% 
2006   13201 4099 1364 797 390 9.5% 
2007   15026 4453 1384 832 360 8.1% 
2008   12920 3779 1029 630 294 7.8% 
2009   11035 3506 857 573 228 6.5% 
2010   11429 3816 904 476 220 5.8% 
2011   11502 3778 936 478 204 5.4% 
2012   10897 3733 1011 531 241 6.5% 
2013   9911 3539 984 553 259 7.3% 
2014   11305 3838 1071 553 262 6.8% 
Total4   223188 72873 23428 14728 6699 9.2% 
 
The final sample consists of 6699 transactions completed by 2350 different sellers 
between 1995 and 2014. Although the seller is always a non-financial public US firm, the 
target and the acquirer could be non-US and private. Table 4.1 displays the filtering process 
per year between 2005 and 2014. We emphasize that the full sample size also depends on the 
availability of additional data. In particular, the Compustat ExecuComp database and the 
Compustat segments data are more incomplete. 
 
Figure 4.1 
Number of deals and average deal value per year by large and small sellers. Average deal value is 
adjusted for inflation using the CPI index (2014-index=1). 
 
                                                 
4 Total values are accumulated from 1995 to 2014 
0100
200300
400500
600700
800900
1000
050
100150
200250
300350
400450
500
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Deal Va
lue $ m
illion
Numbe
r of dea
ls
Deals by large sellers Deals by small sellersAverage deal value adjusted
P a g e  | 16 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of divestiture transactions by small and large sellers in 
the sample between 1995 and 2014. Divestiture activity before 2008 was stable at 350-400 
deals but has remained low at 200-250 deals after 2008. However, the distribution of deals 
between small and large sellers has been persistent with large sellers accounting for 
approximately 60% of all divestitures. From the solid line we observe that average deal value 
adjusted for inflation fluctuates around $200 million and is correlated with economic cycles, 
spiking in 1999, 2007, 2011 and 2014.  
4.2 KEY VARIABLES 
 
In general, the variables are calculated similar to those used by studies in the acquisition 
and divestiture literature, although some variables are entirely designed by the writers of this 
thesis. A thorough description of all variables is provided in the appendix, section 9.2.1 This 
section describes the most essential variables. 
Cumulative abnormal return: We apply a conventional event study methodology5 and 
measure the wealth creation to investors using the abnormal return of the selling firm 
cumulated over the event window (-1,0) 6. Results are robust checked using the different event 
windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). To account for dividends, stock repurchases and stock splits, we 
use the holding period return provided in CRSP. We use the value weighted worldwide index 
from CRSP as a benchmark for the market return as we assume that investors have a global 
investment scope. Betas and standard errors for each event are estimated from CRSP using our 
own programming macro code in STATA with a 250 trading-day interval ending 30 days 
before the announcement day. 
Firm Size: To measure firm size at a given event date we use the market capitalization 
two days prior to the announcement. The market capitalization is standardized into 2014-
dollars using the CPI index. Following Moeller et al. (2004), we classify a seller as large if its 
market capitalization is greater than the market capitalization of the 75th percentile of firms 
listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in a given year. 
Corporate Focus: Like John & Ofek (1995), we define an increase in corporate focus 
as a decrease in the number of business segments the firm is involved in during the fiscal year 
of the event.  
                                                 
5 Section 9.1 describes the econometric assumptions and mathematical calculations 
6 We use the market model as the benchmark model, following amongst many Moeller et al (2004). The 
advantage of the market model is that it is a statistical model, and does not rely on economic arguments. The 
other model frequently used by practitioners is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964), which builds on 
an expected relationship between the risk free rate, market returns and the specific stock returns. For reasons 
documented by Fama & French (2004) we prefer the market model. 
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Buyer Fit: Also motivated by John & Ofek (1995), we identify an operational fit 
between the asset and the buyer if the respective two-digit SIC codes of the core operations are 
identical.   
Low Cash: We define the cash reserve as low if the cash reserve relative to market 
capitalization is below the median level of firms with the same two-digit SIC code in a given 
year. 
Financial Distress: We use the different Z score models developed by Altman (1983) 
to identify financially distressed firms. The Z score (Z’’ score) compresses five (four) ratios 
into a single score in order to predict the probability of default within the next two years for 
manufacturers (non-manufacturers). Appendix 9.2.3 describes the Z-score in detail.  
CEO Divestiture Experience: Inspired by Aktas et al. (2011) we measure CEO 
divestiture experience as the number of deals completed by the incumbent CEO for the current 
firm.  
 
4.3 LIMITATIONS IN THE DATA 
 
The databases used in this study (SDC, CRSP and COMPUSTAT) are commonly 
cited in academic research. Although some papers are concerned with the accuracy and 
completeness of the data, most scholars agree that the data is sufficiently accurate (Barnes et 
al., 2014). In particular, Barnes et al. (2014) studies the accuracy of the SDC database and 
find that it is more accurate for large, public, firms and that it improves over time. Because 
divesting firms typically are larger than the average firm and we only study selling firms that 
are public, we expect inaccuracies in the SDC data to be minimal. In addition, we avoid 
incomplete data series from the 1980s by using a sample starting in 1995.  
However, variables related to corporate focus, executive compensation and bank 
monitoring are obtained from COMPUSTAT and have missing observations. If the data is 
missing in a systematic pattern, we might introduce a bias in our sample. To measure 
corporate focus, we only have segment data after 2006. Because segments data was not 
collected prior to 2007, we treat the data as missing at random. We also assume that 
observations relating to CEO ownership, CEO long-term compensation and CEO insider 
trading are missing at random. As for bank debt, we treat missing observations as no bank 
debt, rather than missing data. These assumptions are bold, but we recognize the limitations 
they may cause and leave it to further studies to improve data collection of executive 
compensation data and the level of bank debt.  
Lastly, many of our variables are measured noisily or used as proxies for an effect. 
For instance, we use decrease in segments over a fiscal year to measure whether a divestiture 
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decreased the amount of segments of the selling firm. As the firm might increase or decrease 
the number of segments for reasons unrelated to the asset sale, there is measurement error in 
our independent variable. Assuming that we measure the effect noisily but unbiased, the 
coefficients of those variables are biased towards zero (classic measurement error, see for 
instance Stock & Watson, 2010). However, most of the variables used in this thesis are 
commonly applied in the divestiture literature.  
 
4.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
The following section discusses the assumptions required for a meaningful 
interpretation of our results and the main econometric considerations taken. The technical 
aspects are described in appendix 9.1.  
 In order to use abnormal returns to measure the impact of a divestiture, two properties 
must be true: firstly (1), the stock price reactions must be informationally efficient given the 
public information about the event, and secondly (2), the choice of benchmark model must be 
correct. Otherwise, our measure of abnormal return would be incorrect under (1) and biased 
under (2). Studies of abnormal returns in finance typically assume that these assumptions hold.  
To interpret announcement abnormal return as wealth creation, we require the absence 
of partial anticipation and information revelation. Partial anticipation causes some of the 
wealth creation of a divestiture to occur prior to the event. On the announcement date, only the 
unanticipated component of the economic benefit will be captured by the cumulative abnormal 
return (Malatesta & Thompson, 1985; Eckbo, 2014). Furthermore, additional information 
about the firm might be revealed as a result of the divestiture announcement which could lead 
to imprecise measurements of value creation. If the additional information has an impact on 
the stock price, cumulative abnormal return would capture both the effect of the divestiture 
and the additional information (Eckbo et al, 1990). We assume the absence of both effects in 
our study. In section 6.1 we relax the assumption of no partial anticipation and tests whether 
partial anticipation affects abnormal return.  
A common issue in finance event-studies is that industry and macro effects affect 
groups in the sample, leading to highly correlated returns within those groups.  For instance 
Mulherin & Boone (2000) find evidence of industry clustering in divestitures. By not taking 
clustering into account, a standard OLS regression will underestimate the standard errors of 
the coefficients and thus create deceivingly small confidence intervals. We control for 
clustering by using two-way clustering on years and two-digit SIC codes by utilizing the ivreg2 
command in STATA constructed by Baum et al. (2007). We choose to cluster on year and two-
digit SIC codes by starting on the lowest level (4 digit-SIC and months) and progressively 
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clustering in bigger groups until there were little changes in the standard errors, as described 
by Cameron & Miller (2015). 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
We discuss our results in two stages. In the first stage we explore key statistics to get 
an indication of the hypotheses derived in section 3. Stage two uses multivariate regression 
analysis to draw inferences about the causal relationships stated by the hypotheses.   
 
5.1 STAGE ONE: DESCRIPTIVE 
 
So far, we have discussed the size effect hypothetically, with no quantitative evidence 
to support our arguments. In this section we provide descriptive statistics to get a sense of the 
relationships proposed by the hypotheses which will be examined in stage two. First, we 
compare announcement abnormal return for the sample of small and large sellers. In 5.1.2 we 
explore the distribution of firm size and divestiture activity. In section 5.1.3 we compare firm 
and deal characteristics between small and large sellers to assess the strength of each 
hypothesis. Lastly, we study the development of abnormal return in subsequent deals.   
 
5.1.1 DIFFERENCE IN ANNOUNCEMENT ABNORMAL RETURN 
 
Hypothesis 1: Small sellers outperform large sellers at the announcement of divestitures. 
 
Following Moeller et al. (2004), we classify a seller as large if its market capitalization 
is greater than the market capitalization of the 75th percentile (4th quartile) of firms listed on 
the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in a given year7. By aggregating the abnormal returns over 
several days we allow for some pre-announcement drift as well as announcement after closing 
or misreporting of the announcement day (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2013). We use (-1, 0), (-1, 1) 
and (-2, 2) as event windows for the calculation of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). For 
a technical description of benchmark model specifications and standard error calculations, see 
appendix 9.1.  
                                                 
7 We refer to large sellers and 4th quartile sellers interchangeably throughout the paper.  
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Table 5.1 reports the abnormal return for the whole sample and for the subsamples of 
small and large sellers. T-values are reported in parentheses. Based on the event window (-1, 
0), we observe that shareholders of selling firms on average enjoy a significantly positive 
abnormal return of 1.25% at the announcement of the divestiture, equivalent to $40.18 million 
dollars. This finding is consistent with that reported by Eckbo & Thorburn (2013).  
 
Table 5.1 
Announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and dollar abnormal returns sorted on small and 
large selling firms. Statistical t-values are reported in parentheses. Average dollar return is the 
abnormal dollar return adjusted for inflation using the US CPI-index (base 2014 dollars). See appendix 
9.1.1 for the mathematical calculations of cumulative abnormal return and the corresponding t-
statistic. In appendix 9.1.2 we outline the mathematical calculations for the dollar abnormal return 
and derive the t-statistic.  
 All 
(1) 
Large 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
Difference 
(4) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-1,0) (%) 1.25 0.51 2.47 -1.96 
 (19.92) (10.26) (17.08) (-12.83) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-1,1) (%) 1.45 0.61 2.84 -2.23 
 (18.90) (10.00) (16.03) (-11.91) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-2,2) (%) 1.59 0.76 2.96 -2.20 
 (16.02) (9.62) (12.94) (-9.11) 
 
Average dollar return ($ million) 40.18 61.17 5.42 55.75 
 (3.02) (2.86) (16.38) (2.61) 
 
Total dollar return ($ million) 269,140 255,464 13,676 
 
 
Observations 6,699 4,176 2,523  
 
Furthermore, we show that small sellers on average outperform large sellers by 1.96%, 
and that abnormal returns are 2.47% and 0.51% for small and large sellers, respectively. The 
finding is also robust to the different event windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). As expected, the t-
values decrease as the event window widens, as the estimated standard deviations increases in 
proportion to the length of the event window.   
Average abnormal dollar return is measured as the total abnormal dollar amount of 
changes in market capitalization due to deal announcements8. Table 5.1 reports that the average 
divestiture generated $40.18 million to its shareholders, with small and large sellers on average 
generating $5.42 million and $61.17 million, respectively. Between 1995 and 2014, the 
accumulated dollar return for all divestitures in our sample amounted to $269 billion.  
                                                 
8 The market capitalization is standardized into 2014-dollars using the CPI index. 
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In sum, we conclude that divestitures on average create positive wealth to shareholders 
and that small sellers outperform large sellers at the deal announcement. In the following sub-
sections we explore how small and large sellers differ in aspects that are relevant to explain 
this size effect. First, section 5.1.2 examines the distribution of firm size to understand the 
difference in size between large and small sellers (4th quartile vs 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartiles). 
Second, 5.1.3 compares key characteristics between the 4th quartile and the rest.  
 
5.1.2 DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM SIZE AND DIVESTITURE ACTIVITY 
 
Figure 5.1  
Distribution of divestiture activity by size quartiles. The sample is all 6699 divestitures completed 
between 1995 and 2014. Size quartiles are defined for each year in the period.  
  
As noted in in the last section, we defined a seller as large if the market capitalization 
is greater than the 75th percentile (4th quartile) of firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and 
AMEX in a given year. In figure 5.1, we split all firms listed on these three stock exchanges 
into quartiles based on market capitalization for each year between 1995 and 2014. The 
distribution of divestiture activity is strongly skewed towards large firms, with 4th quartile 
firms completing more than 60% of all divestitures registered in the United States. The smallest 
75 percent of the firms completed 39 percent of all deals, and there are small differences within 
the first three quartiles. 
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Figure 5.2 
Distribution of adjusted market capitalization and quartile cut-offs in 2014. The sample consists of 
5771 public firms listen on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in 20014. .  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of adjusted market capitalization of all traded firms 
on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in 20149. The red lines mark the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, 
respectively. The distribution of size is clearly centered on smaller values, with half of the 
firms reporting adjusted market capitalization below $560 million. Furthermore, the 
distribution has a very long tail, with 10.67% of the firms being larger than $8 billion.  
When comparing small and large sellers using the 75th percentile (Moeller et al., 2004), 
we are comparing firms that are ‘very’ large to firms that have ‘normal’ size. This observation 
is interesting and suggests that large firms (4th quartile) are inherently different from small 
firms (1st, 2nd, and 3rd quartile). In the next section we examine differences in characteristics 
between small and large sellers.  
 
                                                 
9 The distribution of adjusted market capitalization is similar in the years 1995 to 2013 
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5.1.3 DIFFERENCES IN CHARACTERISTCS BETWEEN SMALL AND 
LARGE SELLERS 
 
In section 5.1.1 we concluded that small sellers outperform large sellers at divestiture 
announcements. By drawing on existing literature, we constructed a set of hypotheses that 
affect abnormal return and possibly explain the size effect. This section investigates differences 
between small and large sellers with respect to characteristics proposed by these hypotheses.  
 
Table 5.2 
Difference in characteristics between small and large sellers. Columns (2) to (4) report average values 
and (5) reports the t-statistics of the difference between (3) and (4). The t-statistic assumes unequal 
variances in the subsamples of small and large sellers. Problems with missing observations were 
discussed in section 4.3.   
 Obervations 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
Small 
(3) 
Large 
(4) 
t-stat 
(5) 
Market Capitalization (Million USD) 6,699 24,600 340 39,257 -23.36 
 
Deal Value (Million USD) 6,699 420 73 629 -9.45 
 
Relative size (%) 6,699 26.54 58.71 7.10 18.34 
 
Number of segments 1,536 3.92 2.83 4.55 -13.61 
 
Decrease in segments 1,536 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.52 
 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer 6,699 0.49 0.44 0.51 -5.72 
 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 6,699 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 
Dummy=1 if low cash relative to industry 5,748 0.53 0.48 0.57 -6.82 
 
Seller bank debt ratio 1,489 0.09 0.12 0.08 1.49 
 
CEO ownership (%) 4,006 1.22 3.01 0.83 6.52 
 
Net CEO insider purchases 3,169 0.49 0.55 0.48 3.17 
 
Long-term compensation plan 4,108 0.89 0.78 0.92 -11.01 
 
Dummy=1 if CEO is hubristic 2,941 0.25 0.29 0.24 2.15 
 
Firm deal order number 6,699 5.95 2.12 8.27 -20.81 
 
CEO deal order number 4,052 4.59 1.65 5.23 -7.70 
 
Financial Distress 5,125 0.29 0.41 0.21 15.51 
 
Table 5.2 shows the sample differences of the most important variables between deals 
by small and large sellers. Averages are reported in column 2-4 and t-statistics for the 
difference is reported in column 5 
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Relative Deal Size: As expected, we find that the average deal value is significantly 
larger for deals done by large firms and that small sellers divest a larger portion of their pre-
deal market capitalization. On average, small sellers divest assets valued at 60% of their market 
value whereas large sellers only divest 7%. As larger relative deal size should increase 
abnormal returns (Asquith et al, 1983), this sample difference indicate that relative deal size 
explains some of the size effect. In section 5.2.3 we test whether the size effect is persistent 
when we control for relative deal size.   
Financial Distress: We measure financial distress using Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 
1983) and show that small sellers are more often in distress than large sellers. Specifically, we 
find that 41% of divestitures made by small sellers are done whilst in financial distress, as 
opposed to 21% for large sellers. Firms in financial distress are usually under the influence of 
creditors, and might divest in order to satisfy creditors’ demands. However, Afshar et al (1992) 
found that divestitures by firms in financial distress perform better than those by healthy firms. 
If this effect also holds for our sample, the difference found between small and large sellers 
indicate that financial distress may explain some of the size effect.  
Fit with The Buyer: To identify operational fit between the buyer and the asset, we 
inspect whether the two-digit SIC codes of the asset and the buyer match. Contrary to our 
expectation, table 5.2 reports that divestitures by large sellers more often have a good fit with 
the asset, which might indicate a negative impact on the size effect. Despite that it might have 
an opposite effect on the size effect, operational fit with the buyer should be included in the 
cross sectional analysis as a control variable.  
 Agency Issues: We measure the degree of agency issues using different proxy variables 
proposed by the literature. Specifically, executive holdings of common stock, long-term 
executive compensation, bank debt ratio and relative cash reserve all contribute to less severe 
issues of managerial discretion (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1987; Hirschey et al., 1990; Lang et 
al., 1995). Table 5.2 reports that small sellers on average have higher CEO ownership and 
greater cash reserves relative to industry peers. These differences indicate that agency issues 
are less severe for small sellers. However, on average large sellers more often have a long-
term CEO compensation plan in place which work to reduce the agency issues for large sellers. 
These findings indicate that the net effect of these determinants is unclear. In section 5.2, we 
examine the effect of each determinant by conducting a cross sectional analysis.   
 Corporate Focus: Following John & Ofek (1995), we identify an increase in corporate 
focus as a decrease in the number of business segments the firm is involved in. We do not find 
a statistical difference in the degree of focus following a divestiture between small and large 
firms. This finding is inconsistent with our hypothesis that focus could explain the size effect. 
However, in the cross sectional analysis in section 5.2, we include corporate focus as a control 
variable.  
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5.1.4 ABNORMAL RETURN IN SUBSEQUENT DIVESTITURES 
 
Numerous studies in the acquisition literature have reported a declining trend in 
announcement abnormal returns of subsequent acquisitions (see Ismail, 2008; Billet & Qian., 
2008; Fuller et al., 2002). Similar studies in the divestiture field are, to the writers´ knowledge, 
non-existing. As reported in table 5.2, deals made by large sellers have a significantly higher 
order10 on average than deals made by small sellers. Therefore, the effect of deal order on 
abnormal return, if any, could potentially explain some of the size effect. In this section we 
test for a declining trend in announcement abnormal returns in the subsequent deal order of 
divestitures and discuss possible explanations. 
 
Hypothesis 3e: Announcement abnormal returns of selling firms decline in the firm’s deal 
order number.   
 
Table 5.3 
Seller abnormal return by deal order: Firm deal order is the order of the deal among the firm’s total 
deals during the sample period. CEO deal order is the order of the deal performed by the incumbent 
CEO. See appendix 9.1.1 for the mathematical calculation of the t-statistics for the different types of t-
tests.  
Panel A: Performance by firm deal order   Panel B: Performance by CEO deal order  
Deal order N CAR (-1, 0) t-stat   Deal order N CAR (-1, 0) t-stat 
1 2,350 1.74 13.38   1 1,850.00 0.94 11.26 
2 1,164 1.58 10.42   2 743 0.85 6.73 
3 682 0.88 4.92   3 391 0.85 4.8 
4 453 1.38 6.00   4 245 1.00 4.63 
5 317 0.54 2.33   5 161 -0.06 -0.22 
6 252 0.56 2.43   6 119 -0.1 -0.35 
7 190 0.76 3.08   7 88 0.13 0.4 
8 154 0.25 0.98   8 69 0.43 1.16 
9 129 0.86 3.12   9 54 0.38 0.9 
10 116 0.89 3.06   10 42 0.82 1.69 
>10 897 0.55 4.77   >10 290 0.46 1.99 
>=2 4,354.00 0.98 14.86   >=2 2202 0.64 8.79 
1 vs >=2   0.77 5.24   1 vs >=2   0.29 2.65 
 
Panel A in table 5.3 reports average announcement abnormal returns sorted on the 
seller’s deal order in the entire sample period.  It depicts that a seller’s first divestiture 
outperforms all subsequent deals with 0.77%. The abnormal return is declining from 1.74% in 
the first deal to 0.54% in the fifth deal with a positive spike in the fourth deal. However, after 
the fifth deal, the return fluctuates around 0.5% with no positive or negative trend. The finding 
                                                 
10 Order is defined as the consecutive deal number in a series of divestitures 
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is consistent with the acquisition literature, though with a sharper decline during the first 5 
deals (e.g. Ismail, 2008; Billet & Qian, 2008), and supports the hypothesis that small sellers 
outperform large sellers because small sellers have significantly lower average deal order than 
large (see table 5.2). In panel B we report abnormal return for deal orders by the incumbent 
CEO. Also here the abnormal return is declining and the first sale outperforms higher order 
sales with a significant 0.29%.  
We find that abnormal returns decline in increasing firm deal order and CEO deal order. 
This is consistent with both the learning hypothesis and the decreasing marginal efficiency of 
capital principal hypothesis. Because large sellers complete more divestitures than small 
sellers, this finding indicates that small sellers outperform large sellers at the announcement of 
divestitures.  
 
5.2 STAGE TWO: CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we investigate whether the size effect found in 5.1.1 can be explained 
by characteristics put forward in the existing divestiture literature using multivariate analysis. 
The discussion consists of three main parts. First, we test whether the size effect is persistent 
after controlling for relative deal size. Next, section 5.2.3 uses all variables proposed by the 
literature to determine whether the size effect can be explained by all hypotheses in 
combination. Lastly, 5.2.4 discusses the impact of the different effects on abnormal return. 
First, we discuss correlation between the various variables to be included in the regression 
model.  
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5.2.1 CORRELATION BETWEEN 
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5.2.2 RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 
 
Building on Asquith et al. (1983), we expect the relative size of the deal to have a 
positive impact on abnormal return. We hypothesized that the relative deal size is likely to 
explain some of the size effect because small sellers divest assets with a larger relative value 
than large sellers. Following we test whether the size effect is persistent when controlling for 
relative deal size. In addition, we investigate the functional form of absolute size and relative 
size, and whether there exists an interaction effect between size and relative size.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The size effect is persistent when controlling for relative deal size  
 
Table 5.4 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm size and relative deal size. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Appendix 9.5.1 
and 9.5.2 conduct robust checks with event windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). VIF tables are provided in 
appendix 9.4.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Log market capitalization 
 
-0.323***    -0.274***  -0.275*** 
Dummy=1 if seller is large 
 
 -1.579***  -1.058***  -1.850***  
Relative deal size 
 
0.660*** 0.741*** 0.684*** 0.684*** 1.258** 0.667* -0.191 
1st quartile 
 
  2.137*** 1.079    
2nd quartile 
 
  1.954*** 0.896**    
3rd qaurtile 
 
  1.058***     
Relative Size Squared 
 
    -0.0288   
Seller is large x Relative 
deal size 
 
     3.278***  
Log market cap. x 
Relative deal size 
 
      0.500*** 
_cons 3.551*** 2.036*** 0.461*** 1.519*** 3.058*** 2.079*** 2.848*** 
N 6699 6699 6699 6699 6699 6699 6699 
R2 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.043 
 
 As discussed, we classify a seller as large if its market capitalization was greater than 
the 75th percentile (4th quartile) of public firms in the US for a given year. We measure the 
effect of firm size using a dummy variable taking the value one if the seller is large in 
regression (1), and the logarithm of market capitalization in regression (2). In both regressions 
the size effect is significant at the 1% level. Hence, relative size, at least in linear form, does 
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not seem to explain much of the variation attributed to size. In appendix 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 we 
show that the size effect is persistent when using event windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2).  
Having determined that the size effect is persistent, we dig deeper into the effect and 
explore its functional form. From the descriptive statistics in section 5.1.2, we observed that 
the distribution of firm size is centered on the smallest 75 percent of firms and that the 4th 
quartile is considerably larger than the rest. We argued that the distribution could cause large 
sellers to be fundamentally different from the rest and hence be the source of the size effect. 
Alternatively, the size effect could be a continuous effect relevant across all ranges of sizes.  
Consistent with a fundamental difference, regression (3) shows that abnormal returns of the 
1st, 2nd and 3rd quartiles are significantly different from the 4th quartile. However regression (4) 
show that the 3rd quartile is significantly different from both the 2nd and 4th quartile11, indicative 
of a continuous effect of size on abnormal return. These findings indicate that there is a size 
effect beyond the simple difference between the long tail and the common sized firms.  
We now investigate the functional form of relative deal size and the interaction effect 
between size and relative deal size. Regression (5) includes the squared term of relative size, 
but we do not find evidence of a quadratic effect of relative deal size on abnormal return. In 
regression (6) and (7) we test the interaction between relative deal size and absolute firm size 
using a size dummy and the log of market capitalization, respectively, to measure size. Both 
interaction terms are positive and significant at 1% significance level, implying that the effect 
of relative size is larger if the seller is large. We interpret these coefficients after controlling 
for more variables in section 5.2.4.  
The findings in this section confirm that small sellers outperform large sellers after 
controlling for relative deal size. The interaction terms in model (6) and (7) cause a high degree 
of multicollinearity between size and the interaction term. This introduces additional 
correlation between the variables which decreases the statistical significance of size, leading 
us to interpret the corresponding size coefficients to be statistically significant on at least the 
1% level. In sum, we find strong evidence that the size effect is not controlled for by relative 
deal size.  
 
5.2.3 PERSISTENCE OF THE SIZE EFFECT 
 
In table 5.5, we regress announcement abnormal returns on different measures of firm 
size and control for the characteristics proposed by the literature. To test whether these 
characteristics explain the size effect we want all the variation from size to be captured in the 
other size variables. Hence, we do not include interaction terms between size and the different 
                                                 
11 We suspect that the 3rd quartile is not significant from the 1st quartile because of few observations in the 1st 
quartile and large variance.  
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characteristics. However, in the next section we include interaction terms to account for 
different effects from these characteristics between small and large sellers.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The size effect is persistent after controlling for relative deal size, corporate 
focus, buyer fit, agency issues, financial distress and firm deal order.  
 
Table 5.5 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Appendix 9.5.3 
and 9.5.4 conduct robust checks with event windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). VIF tables are provided in 
appendix 9.4. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures:     
Dummy=1 if seller is large -1.292**   -0.977** 
Log market capitalization  -0.408**   
Dummy=1 if 1st quartile   2.333 1.357 
Dummy=1 if 2nd quartile   2.130 1.154 
Dummy=1 if 3rd quartile   0.977**  
     
Relative deal size 1.754*** 1.692*** 1.714*** 1.714*** 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in focus 0.388 0.359 0.404 0.404 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer -0.183 -0.133 -0.180 -0.180 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 0.522 0.532 0.497 0.497 
Dummy=1 if low cash -1.078** -1.282** -1.077* -1.077* 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed -0.451 -0.327 -0.390 -0.390 
Bank debt ratio -0.0751* -0.0784* -0.0741* -0.0741* 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 0.0434 0.0615 0.0420 0.0420 
CEO ownership 0.00769*** 0.00345 0.00549 0.00549 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash -0.0316 -0.0285* -0.0280 -0.0280 
Long-term compensation ratio -0.0168* -0.00955 -0.0155** -0.0155** 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and low cash 0.0759* 0.104** 0.0756 0.0756 
CEO deal order number -0.0191 0.00481 -0.0210 -0.0210 
     
constant 2.689*** 5.014*** 1.346** 2.322*** 
N 912 912 912 912 
adj. R2 0.151 0.156 0.151 0.151 
 
In regression (1) we capture the size effect using a dummy taking the value one if the 
seller is large (4th quartile). This variable is statistically significant at the 5% significance level 
and imply that small sellers on average experience 1.292% higher announcement abnormal 
return than large sellers after controlling for key characteristics. In regression (2) the size effect 
is measured using the log of market capitalization which is also significant at the 5% 
significance level. Specifically, given a 10% difference in market capitalization between two 
selling firms, we expect the smaller firm to enjoy a roughly 0.04% higher abnormal return than 
the larger firm. The model predicts that the difference in average abnormal return between the 
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50th and 75th percentile cutoff of firms listed on the NYSE12 in 2014 is approximately 0.25%, 
which is economically significant13.  
When comparing the results in table 5.5 against 5.4, we find that the size effect 
measured using the dummy decreases when we control for all characteristics, whereas the size 
effect captured by log market capitalization increases. This finding is interesting and suggests 
that the control variables in the model explain some of the size effect caused by systematic 
differences between small and large sellers, but strengthens the size effect caused by 
continuous variation within size ranges.  
Now that we have determined that the size effect is persistent to firm and deal 
characteristics, we examine the functional form of the remaining effect. In regression (3) we 
capture firm size using dummy variables for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartile of firms listed on 
NYSE. Sellers within the 3rd quartile enjoy significantly higher abnormal return compared to 
4th quartile sellers, but the difference is not significant for 1st and 2nd quartile sellers despite 
large coefficients. The insignificance of the 1st and 2nd quartile relative to regression (3) in table 
5.5 is most likely caused by greater variance among small sellers and considerably fewer 
observations in table 5.5 compared to 5.4 (912 vs. 6699).  
In regression (4) we include dummy variables for whether the seller is in the 1st, 2nd or 
4th quartile. Also here the 1st and 2nd quartiles are insignificant, meaning that we cannot 
conclude that 3rd quartile sellers outperform 1st or 2nd quartile sellers. However, here the 
insignificance is also likely to be caused by high variance and few observations.  
 We have concluded that the size effect in corporate divestitures is not explained by 
variation in relative deal size, corporate focus, fit with the buyer, agency issues and financial 
distress. In appendix 9.5.3 and 9.5.4 we run the same regressions using event windows (-1, 1) 
and (-2, 2), respectively. Longer event windows introduce more noise and the coefficients in 
the model therefore become less significant. The coefficient for log market capitalization 
remains significant at 5% level, whereas the coefficient for the size dummy becomes 
insignificant. This finding indicates that the remaining size effect is primarily a continuous 
effect rather than an effect caused by systematic difference between the very large and 
‘normal’.  
 
                                                 
12 New York Stock Exchange 
13 The 50th and 75th percentiles were 560 and 2,303 $million, respectively, in 2014. In terms of log (base=10), 
the difference equals 0.62 which translates into an effect of 0.25% on abnormal return given the coefficient of 
0.408 in model (2).   
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5.2.4 EFFECT OF CHARACTERISTICS ON ABNORMAL RETURN 
 
Table 5.6 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. Appendix 9.5.5 
and 9.5.6 conduct robust checks with event windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). VIF tables are provided in 
appendix 9.4. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures     
Dummy=1 if seller is large -0.736  -0.892 -0.537 
Log market capitalization  -0.280   
     
Relative deal size 1.748*** 0.559** 1.743*** 1.767*** 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in segments 0.823 -1.199 0.917  
Dummy=1 if increase in Herfindahl    1.637 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer 0.330 -0.605 0.351 0.190 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 2.329 -0.607 2.340 2.302 
Dummy=1 if low cash -1.061** -1.299** -0.594* -1.005** 
Bank debt ratio -0.0757* -0.0732* -0.0588* -0.0749* 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 0.0619 0.0780  0.0607 
CEO ownership 0.0103*** 0.0153*** 0.00866*** 0.0119*** 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash -0.0259 -0.0347*  -0.0214 
Long-term compensation ratio -0.0169* -0.00895 -0.0129* -0.0165* 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and 
low cash 
0.0791* 0.121**  0.0719* 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed 0.237 2.830 0.385 0.115 
CEO deal order number -0.170 -0.544 -0.180 -0.257 
     
Interaction with 4th quartile size     
Seller is large x relative deal size 5.437***  5.460*** 5.446*** 
Seller is large x decrease in segments -0.973  -1.083  
Seller is large x Herfindahl    -1.856 
Seller is large x Fit with buyer -0.575  -0.592 -0.440 
Seller is large x LBO buyer -2.078  -2.137 -2.062 
Seller is large x not financial distressed -0.987  -0.709 -0.852 
Seller is large x CEO deal order number 0.169  0.188 0.258 
     
Interaction with log market cap.     
Log market cap. x relative deal size  0.703***   
Log market cap. x decrease in segments  0.135   
Log market cap. x Fit with buyer  0.0669   
Log market cap. x LBO buyer  0.112   
Log market cap. x not financial distressed  -0.398   
Log market cap. x CEO deal order number  0.0571*   
     
constant 2.083 3.851 1.826 1.917 
N 912 912 912 912 
adj. R2 0.161 0.181 0.162 0.165 
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In this section we examine the effect of firm and deal characteristics on announcement 
abnormal return. In particular, we examine hypotheses 3a to 3e which we derived in section 3. 
To test whether the effects are conditional on firm size, we include interaction variables 
between characteristics and size.  As expected, these interaction variables render the size 
measures insignificant because much of the variation from size is captured by the interactions. 
This is not a problem for the persistence of the size effect.  
 
 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 
 In regression (1) in table 5.6 we find that the relative size of the deal has a positive and 
highly significant effect on announcement abnormal return. It is unquestionably the most 
influential determinant of value creation in divestitures depicted by our model. The result is 
consistent with Zaima & Hearth (1985) and Mulherin & Boone (2000) who all find 
significantly positive effects from relative deal size in divestitures. Furthermore, we show that 
the effect of relative deal size is conditional on the firm size of the seller. Specifically, an 
increase in relative deal size by 10 percentage point leads to 0.175 percentage point higher 
abnormal return if the seller is small, and 0.719 percentage points higher abnormal return if 
the seller is large. This result implies that large sellers experience higher value creation per 
dollar of assets divested. In regression (2) we measure firm size using the log of market 
capitalization and reach the same conclusion.  
A possible explanation for the difference in effects is that divestitures by large sellers 
are less anticipated by the market if the deal is relatively large, whereas divestitures by small 
sellers are typically unanticipated regardless of the relative size. The explanation builds on two 
arguments. Firstly, large sellers typically divest asset with low relative deal size causing 
divestiture with large relative size to be more surprising. On average, large sellers divest only 
7% of their pre-deal market capitalization whereas small sellers on average divest 60%. 
Secondly, many subsequent asset sales with high relative deal size will naturally cause the firm 
Hypothesis 3a: Increase in corporate focus due to an asset sale affects abnormal return 
positively.  
Hypothesis 3b: Better fit between the target and buyer leads to larger abnormal 
announcement return for the seller. 
Hypothesis 3c: Greater alignment of incentives and more bank monitoring will affect 
abnormal return positively if the firm is healthy and has low cash.  
Hypothesis 3d: Divestitures by firms in financial distress experience higher announcement 
abnormal returns than healthy firms.  
Hypothesis 3e: Announcement abnormal return of selling firms decline in the firm’s deal 
order number.   
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to be smaller which cannot continue indefinitely without it becoming a small firm14. On the 
contrary, large sellers divesting asset with low relative size can typically maintain a high 
frequency of asset sales over time which makes each deal more anticipated. We argue that 
divestitures by small sellers are surprising to the market regardless of the relative deal size 
because they typically have only completed 1 deal in the past. Hence, we expect that large 
sellers divesting assets with high relative deal size perform less badly than those divesting 
assets with low relative size.  We explore the effect of partial anticipation in section 6.1. 
 
AGENCY ISSUES 
 Following Lang et al. (1995) firms are motivated to divest assets because proceeds from 
asset sales often is a cheap financing alternative compared to equity or debt in the existence of 
adverse selection or debt overhang. However, the existence of agency issues could offset this 
positive effect if the proceeds are not employed to maximize shareholder wealth. In regression 
(1) we use CEO stock ownership (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1987), bank debt (Hirschey et al., 
1990) and long-term CEO compensation (Tehranian et al., 1987) as proxy variables for the 
degree of agency issues. However, for these variables to be relevant determinants for the 
financing hypothesis presented by Lang et al. (1995), we must control for whether the 
motivation for the divestiture was to obtain cash or not. We include a dummy variable for 
whether the cash level in the selling firm is below the median value in the respective industry15 
and argue that firms with low cash are more likely to sell assets to obtain cash. Because sellers 
in financial distress typically sell assets to pay back debt, they have a different motive16 to sell 
compared to healthy sellers, leaving the financing hypothesis less relevant. Therefore, to 
control for situations where the financing hypothesis is relevant, we include an interaction 
variable that takes the value one if the firm has low cash and the firm is not financially 
distressed and zero otherwise. 
 In regression (1) we show that increased long-term compensation to CEOs given that 
the seller has low cash and is not financially distressed has a positive effect on abnormal return, 
significant at the 10% level. Regression (2) measures size using the log of market 
capitalization, and leaves the same coefficient significant at 5% level. These findings support 
the notion that when firms divest assets to obtain cash, the market views higher long-term 
compensation to CEOs positively because it signals better alignment of incentives and hence 
less agency issues. If the condition for the financing hypothesis is not satisfied, the effect from 
increased long-term compensation is weakly negative and at best significant at the 10% level.  
                                                 
14 Frequent large acquisitions could balance out the effect, but it is untypical that firms acquire many subsequent 
assets valued above 50% of their market capitalization (Thomson Financial SDC database). 
15 Cash is relative to market capitalization of the industry defined as the two-digit sic code.  
16 In financial distress, firms might divest assets to pay back debt to creditors.  
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 Moreover, if the seller is healthy and has low cash, we find weak evidence that CEO 
ownership contributes negatively whilst the effect of bank debt is insignificant. However, if 
the condition is not satisfied, the coefficient for CEO ownership is positive and significant 
whereas bank debt is negative and significant. These results are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that when firms sell assets to finance new projects, more monitoring by banks and 
higher CEO ownership limit management’s incentives to freely allocate cash to poor projects, 
which would have a negative effect on abnormal return.   
 Lastly, we show in regression (1) and (2) that the coefficient for low cash is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Due to the interaction variables including low cash, 
we interpret the coefficient as the effect of low cash given that the seller is financially 
distressed17. Specifically, low cash decreases abnormal return by 1.06 percentage points if the 
seller is distressed. A possible explanation is that financially distressed firms with low cash 
typically are distressed because of liquidity dry-ups, whereas distressed firms with high cash 
typically have problems with insolvency. The former group might be pressured by creditors to 
divest assets quickly and hence run the risk of a sub-optimal divestiture, while the latter group 
avoid this problem by having more time.  
 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 Following Altman (1983) we use the Z-score model to measure financial distress18. In 
regression (3) we exclude the interaction variables between low cash and financial distress to 
better show the pure effect from financial distress. We do not find support for the hypothesis 
that sellers in distress experience greater abnormal return. The finding is hence inconsistent 
with Afshar et al (1992) who argued that by completing a successful asset sale, the firm might 
be able to avoid an expected costly bankruptcy, and thus signal good news to the market. 
 Furthermore, we do not find evidence for a different effect from financial distress for 
small and large sellers. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis that the effect is larger for 
small firms because asset sales by large distressed firms do not significantly reduce the risk of 
bankruptcy, as the deal value is typically small relative to the size of the outstanding liabilities.  
 
CORPORATE FOCUS AND FIT WITH THE BUYER 
 In model (1) and (2) we conclude that neither a decrease in the number of segments, a 
good operational fit with the buyer nor the existence of an LBO buyer significantly affect 
abnormal returns at divestiture announcements. In regression (4) we replace the decrease in 
number of segments with the Herfindahl index as a measure of increase in focus, but find no 
                                                 
17 The coefficient is the effect of low cash given that the firm is financially distressed or that CEO ownership, 
long-term compensation to CEOs and bank debt all are zero. We believe the latter is unlikely.  
18 Altman’s Z-score is described in detail in section 9.2.2 
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significant effect on abnormal return. This in inconsistent with studies such as John & Ofek. 
(1995), Dittmar & Shivdasani (2003) and Berger & Ofek (1999) who all documented 
significant positive abnormal return for focus-increasing divestitures ranging from 1.5% to 
3.4%. In addition, it is inconsistent with Hite et al. (1987) who found that allocation of assets 
from a lower-valuing seller to a higher-valuing buyer is important for value-creation in 
corporate divestitures. 
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6. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SIZE EFFECT 
  
So far, this thesis has demonstrated that small sellers outperform large sellers at the 
announcement of divestitures. Drawing on core research in the divestiture field, we compiled 
a set of characteristics that we expected would explain the size effect. Interestingly, the size 
effect was still persistent after controlling for these characteristics. In this section we introduce 
two alternative explanations. First, we investigate whether the size effect can be explained by 
divestitures by large sellers being more anticipated by the market than divestitures by small 
sellers. Second, we discuss whether the announcement abnormal return for divestitures by 
small sellers is likely to be larger because the idiosyncratic risk in announcement return is 
higher for divestitures completed by small sellers.  
 
6.1 PARTIAL ANTICIPATION 
 
Several studies in the acquisition literature (Eckbo, 2014; Schipper & Thompson, 1983; 
Loderer & Martin, 1990; Billet & Qian, 2008) have pointed to the issue of partial anticipation 
when studying acquisition gains in event studies. Eckbo (2014) argue that cumulative abnormal 
return only captures the unanticipated component of the economic benefit of the acquisition. 
If the acquirer is large and has completed several acquisitions in the past, the anticipation is 
typically higher and the abnormal return is smaller. Schipper & Thompson (1983) predict that 
no returns should be observed on the announcement of subsequent deals following an 
announced acquisition program. An extension of this work was provided by Loderer & Martin 
(1990), who studied acquisition series starting after a two-year non-acquisition hiatus and 
ending with a similar two-year hiatus. They contended that investors partially anticipate 
subsequent deals after observing an implicit acquisition program take shape.  
In section 5.1.3 we showed that deals by small and large sellers on average have a deal 
order of 2.11 and 8.25 divestitures, respectively. Hence, we hypothesize that the anticipation 
of divestitures by large sellers are higher than for small sellers. In turn, this difference in 
anticipation could potentially explain the size effect.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we first conduct a logit analysis of the likelihood of a 
given seller completing a divestiture in a given year. Next, we control for the predicted 
probability in the multivariate regression to determine whether partial anticipation explains the 
size effect. We assume that if we can predict the likelihood of a deal by studying the past, so 
can the market. To perform the logit analysis, we constructed a panel data set for all the selling 
firms between 1995 and 2014. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the seller has 
completed at least one divestiture during a given year, and zero otherwise. Using this approach 
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our dataset consists of 6514 seller-year combinations with all variables included. If a seller has 
completed more than one divestiture during a given year, we get a downward bias in the 
predicted probability because we only consider the first divestiture in that year.  
 
Table 6.1 
Logistic regression analysis of the likelihood of an asset sale in a given year for a given seller. One, 
two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. To interpret the 
coefficients as probabilities, we study the marginal effects included in appendix 9.6.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Deal Dummy Deal Dummy Deal Dummy 
    
Panel A. Variables of interest    
Number of past divestitures by the firm 0.0684*** -0.00801  
Number of past divestitures by the CEO  0.233*** 0.209*** 
Dummy=1 if CEO change same year as the deal 0.303*** 0.320*** 0.259*** 
Dummy=1 if CEO change year prior to deal  -0.0313 0.0128 0.00727 
Dummy=1 if Financial distress year prior 0.537*** 0.476*** 0.417*** 
Log market capitalization year prior 0.123*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 
Abnormal return of previous divestiture19 -0.479 -0.424 -0.616 
Dummy=1 if CEO is hubristic year prior   0.169** 
    
Panel B: Control variables    
Tobins Q -0.00134 -0.00147 -0.0160 
S&P 500 market return year prior 1.708*** 1.690*** 1.533*** 
Stock return year prior -0.390*** -0.421*** -0.415*** 
Cash-assets ratio year prior -0.344* -0.220 -0.343 
Number of M&A deals in US year prior -0.0000696*** -0.0000714*** -0.0000617*** 
Number of M&A deals in industry year prior 0.00000390 -0.00000633 -0.0000331 
    
constant -1.663*** -1.755*** -1.805*** 
N 8694 8556 6514 
Pseudo R2 0.0532 0.0807 0.0811 
 
The results of the logit regression is reported in table 6.1. Control variables are reported 
in panel B. We follow Billet & Qian (2008) and control for firm specific characteristics such 
as Tobin’s Q, cash-asset ratio, market return and stock return of the year prior to the divestiture 
announcement. Because acquisitions and divestitures tend to cluster in time (Mitchel and 
Mulherin, 1996) we control for M&A waves by including the total number of deals completed 
in the US the year prior to the deal as well as the total number of deals within the same two-
digit SIC-code industry as the seller.  
In regression (1) we show that the likelihood of a seller completing a divestiture in a 
given year increases with the number of past divestitures. Model (2) includes the number of 
past deals completed by the incumbent CEO-firm combination maximum 5 years apart. 
                                                 
19 Abnormal return of the previous divestiture takes the value zero if the seller has not completed divestitures in 
the past.  
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Interestingly, the coefficient for past CEO-deals is positive and renders the number of past 
firm-deals insignificant. Given average values of all other covariates, an increase in past CEO-
deals by one increases the likelihood by 4.2 percentage points2021. This result suggest that 
market anticipation of future divestitures is more closely attached to past CEO experience than 
to firm experience.   
From regression (2) we also infer that the probability of an asset sale is larger if the 
seller was in financial distress the year prior to the deal, or changed its CEO during the same 
year as the divestiture. Specifically, the likelihood of a divestiture is 8.6 percentage point 
higher if the seller is distressed the year prior to the deal and 5.8 percentage points higher if 
the firm changes CEO during the same year. These findings are consistent with our 
expectations. Firstly, firms in financial distress are more likely to divest because they are 
typically forced by creditors to obtain cash. Secondly, newly hired CEOs might be more prone 
to divest because the announcement typically signals a correction of poor management by the 
previous CEO, rather than poor management by himself.  
 Regression (2) reports that an increase in market capitalization by 50% is expected to 
increase the likelihood of a divestiture by 1 percentage point22. Hence, a change in market size 
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile would imply an increase in the likelihood of a 
deal by 6 percentage points. Clearly, the market considers firm size in its anticipation of future 
deals, but the effect is small compared to past CEO-deals and financial distress.  
 Lastly, in regression (3) we examine the effect of a hubristic CEO the year prior to the 
deal. Studies in the acquisition literature contend that the likelihood of an acquisition increases 
if the CEO is overconfident (hubristic) (Billet & Qian, 2008). An overconfident CEO believes 
he can manage assets better than existing owners and hence engages in more acquisitions. 
Applying the same logic to divestitures would entail that CEOs would be more likely to keep 
assets because he thinks he can manage them better than potential buyers. We therefore expect 
the likelihood of a divestiture to be less likely if the CEO is hubristic. However, regression (3) 
depicts that the likelihood of a divestiture increases if the CEO is hubristic.   
                                                 
20 A description of interpreting the coefficients from the logit regression using the margins function in STATA 
is provided in 9.1.4 
21 The complete table of marginal effects is provided in 9.6 
22 See appendix 9.6 
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Table 6.2  
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures:     
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile -1.292** -1.392**   
Log market capitalization   -0.408** -0.493** 
     
Relative deal size 1.754*** 1.753*** 1.692*** 1.678*** 
     
Predicted probability of divestiture  -0.162  2.104 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in focus 0.388 0.351 0.359 0.293 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer -0.183 -0.235 -0.133 -0.203 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 0.522 0.479 0.532 0.484 
Dummy=1 if low cash -1.078** -0.939* -1.282** -1.182** 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed -0.451 -0.345 -0.327 -0.0556 
Bank debt ratio -0.0751* -0.0747* -0.0784* -0.0777* 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 0.0434 0.0406 0.0615 0.0672 
CEO ownership 0.00769*** 0.00735*** 0.00345 0.00246 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash -0.0316 -0.0343* -0.0285* -0.0286* 
Long-term compensation -0.0168* -0.0167* -0.00955 -0.00826 
Long-term compensation x not distressed and low cash 0.0759* 0.0642 0.104** 0.0950* 
CEO deal order number -0.0191 -0.0128 0.00481 -0.0637 
     
constant 2.689*** 2.737*** 5.014*** 5.058*** 
N 912 908 912 908 
adj. R2 0.151 0.154 0.156 0.161 
 
 Based on the logit model (3) in table 6.1, we predicted the probability of a divestiture 
being completed by a given firm for a given year. If a seller completes more than one sale 
during one year we force the same probability for all the divestitures in that year. In table 6.2 
we control for this probability in a multivariate regression using the same control variables as 
in section 5.2.3. The results show that the size effect is persistent after controlling for partial 
anticipation. The effect is persistent both when measuring size using dummy and log of market 
capitalization.  Hence, we do not find evidence in support for the hypothesis that divestitures 
by large sellers have lower abnormal returns because they are more anticipated by the market.  
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6.2 IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK  
 
 Another possible explanation for the size effect is that managers care about 
idiosyncratic risk and will not divest unless the expected return compensates for the uncertainty 
introduced by the asset sale. Because smaller firms have a larger standard deviation in 
announcement abnormal returns, the two effects in tandem might explain the size effect.  
 
Figure 6.1 
Average cumulative abnormal return, standard deviation and CAR/standard deviation reported by 
bins of size percentile ranges. Data points at 10% refer to the smallest 10%. Data points at 20% refer 
to the deals done by firms between the 10th and 20th percentile of adjusted market capitalization in the 
period between 1995 and 2014, and so on. Market capitalization is adjusted for inflation using the US 
CPI-index (base 2014 dollars). 
 
 Figure 6.1 displays the average announcement abnormal return, standard deviation and 
the ratio of abnormal return to standard deviation by bins consisting of the 10 preceding 
percentiles. Because announcement abnormal return has been adjusted for the market return, 
the standard deviation is a measure of the idiosyncratic risk. We observe that abnormal return 
and standard deviation decline with increasing percentile bins. However, standard deviation 
declines more than abnormal return, causing the ratio of the two to also decline.  
 We argue that the declining standard deviation could be caused by characteristics 
related to the size of the seller, and thus be expected by managers for two main reasons. Firstly, 
managers of small selling firms typically have less experience in conducting divestitures (see 
table 5.2), leading to greater uncertainty about the true value of the divested assets. On the 
contrary, managers of large selling firms might have learned from stock reactions of previous 
asset sales and therefore have a more precise estimate of the true value (see Aktas et al, 2009).  
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Secondly, an asset sale by a small seller might work as a stronger signal to the market about 
the value of the remaining assets because small sellers generally divest a larger portion of their 
market value (see table 5.2).  
 Managers generally care about the idiosyncratic risk of their own firm. In contrast to 
standard portfolio theory, which states that investors only care about systematic risk as all other 
forms of variations can be diversified away, managers are often exposed to non-diversifiable 
idiosyncratic risk of the firm they manage (see for instance Glover & Levine, 2014; Coles et 
al, 2006; Meulbroek, 2001). This is due to incentive pay plans and ownership requirements 
with the purpose of aligning the incentives of the manager with those of the shareholders. 
Managers might also care about idiosyncratic risk due to employment risk. Amihud & Lev 
(1981) argue that the likelihood for managers of losing their job or professional reputation 
depends in part on the probability of negative outcomes for the firm. 
 If managers care about idiosyncratic risk, a rational manager will only divest if the 
expected return compensates for the added uncertainty introduced by the divestiture. Because 
small sellers face a higher standard deviation in abnormal return on divestiture announcements, 
we expect managers of small sellers to require a higher premium than managers of large sellers.  
From figure 6.1, we see that the ratio between average abnormal return and standard deviation 
is falling with increased average market capitalization. This finding is consistent with 
managers being risk-averse and requiring a higher abnormal return to compensate for the added 
risk of small sellers. In sum, we argue that idiosyncratic risk is a plausible explanation for the 
size effect. Further research is needed to formalize a model of risk-averse managers that can 
be tested empirically.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite considerable shareholder wealth creation in corporate divestitures, the existing 
literature remains somewhat fragmented and inconsistent as to what determines these gains. 
This paper attempted, in all modesty, to expand the understanding of these determinants by 
specifically investigating the effect of absolute firm size on announcement abnormal return. 
Moeller et al. (2004) studied the effect of firm size on acquisitions abnormal return and found 
that small buyers outperform large buyers, and that the effect is not explained by characteristics 
of the firm or the deal. To the best of our knowledge, similar studies have not been conducted 
on divestitures. We use a sample of 6699 divestitures completed by 2350 different sellers 
between 1995 and 2014. We identify divestitures and sellers from the Thomson Financial SDC 
database and use CRSP and COMPUSTAT to construct the variables needed.  
First, we found that shareholders of divesting firms on average enjoy a significantly 
positive abnormal return of 1.25%23, equivalent to $40 million. When splitting the sample 
based on firm size, we show that small firms significantly outperform large firms by 1.96% 
and that the abnormal returns are 2.47% and 0.51% for small and large sellers respectively24. 
The result is robust to different event windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). Next, we examined possible 
reasons for this size effect by drawing on existing literature in the divestiture and acquisition 
research. This process led to a set of hypotheses that we believed could explain abnormal 
returns and possibly also the size effect.  
(H2) Holding the absolute gain fixed, the smaller the selling firm, the larger the 
percentage gain (Asquith et al., 1983). Since small firms typically divest a larger fraction of 
their market capitalization, we expected small firms to outperform large firms. (H3A) 
Motivated by John & Ofek (1995) and Dittmar & Shivdasani (2003), we hypothesized that 
focus-increasing asset sales affect value creation positively and that the effect is larger for 
small sellers. (H3B) According to Hite et al. (1987), seller gains are realized if assets are 
allocated from a lower-valuing seller to a higher-valuing buyer. We argued that operational fit 
could explain some of the size effect if small sellers more often divest to buyers with a good 
fit with the asset. (H3C) We contended that agency issues of holding cash are less severe in 
small firms. Following Lang et al. (1995), this would affect seller gains positively because 
management is less likely to divest to obtain cash to pursue their own objectives. (H3D) 
Because financial distress typically has a positive net effect on abnormal return (Afshar et al., 
1992), we expected that small sellers have higher gains because they are more likely to be 
financially distressed. (H3E) Lastly, we hypothesized that the size effect could be explained 
                                                 
23 Event window: (-1,0) 
24 Both are statistically significantly different from zero 
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by declining abnormal return in the subsequent deal order because small sellers typically 
complete fewer asset sales over time compared to large sellers.   
We analyzed the effect of these hypothesis on abnormal return and obtained the 
following results organized according to the hypotheses:   
 
H2 First we concluded that small sellers on average divest a larger portion of their pre-
deal market capitalization and that relative deal size affects abnormal return 
positively but does not explain the size effect. However, the effect of relative deal 
size is greater if the seller is large. We argued that a possible explanation for the 
difference in effects is that divestitures by large sellers are less anticipated by the 
market if the deal is relatively large, whereas divestitures by small sellers are 
typically unanticipated regardless of the relative size 
 
H3 (A) We did not find evidence in support for the hypothesis that focus-increasing 
asset sales create value. Our finding is inconsistent with that found by John & Ofek 
(1995) and Dittmar & Shivdasani (2003), but we use a larger dataset and control for 
more determinants. (B) Also inconsistent with previous literature, we found no 
evidence of a positive effect from operational fit with the buyer. (C) We further 
found that CEO ownership, long-term compensation and bank debt in general have 
significant effects on abnormal return. However, we do not find convincing support 
for the hypothesis that they limit the motivation to divest assets to obtain cash to 
finance poor projects. (D) Moreover, we did not find support for the hypothesis that 
sellers in financial distress experience greater abnormal return. (E) Lastly, we 
conclude that abnormal return is declining in subsequent deal order but that it does 
not explain abnormal return when controlling for other effects. Hence it is 
inconsistent with the learning hypothesis and marginal efficiency hypothesis.  
 
H4 We conclude that the size effect in corporate divestitures is not explained by 
variations in relative deal size, corporate focus, fit with the buyer, agency issues and 
financial distress. However, the effect is only partly persistent to longer event 
windows (-2, 2) and (-1, 1), which is likely to be caused by more measurement noise. 
We therefore have more confidence in the short interval (-1, 0).   
 
We introduced two alternative explanations for the size effect: (A1) Partial anticipation and 
(A2) idiosyncratic risk.  
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A1 We showed that it is possible to partly predict the likelihood of a divestiture taking 
place for a given seller in a given year. The likelihood of a deal is higher if the 
incumbent CEO has completed many divestitures in the recent past, if the seller was 
distressed before the deal or if the firm changed its CEO prior to the deal. Despite 
some predictive power, we do not find evidence for that partial anticipation explains 
the size effect in divestitures.  
A2 Lastly, we argued that mangers care about idiosyncratic risk and hence require a 
higher premium to compensate for the uncertainty introduced by the divestiture. 
Because small sellers face higher idiosyncratic risk when they announce a 
divestiture, we expect small sellers to enjoy a higher abnormal return than large 
sellers.  
 
Taken as a whole, our study provides evidence that the size of the seller is an important 
determinant for wealth creation in divestitures. Further work is required to fully understand 
what causes this effect. For example, formalizing a model of risk-averse managers with 
empirical testing would enable us to better account for differences in idiosyncratic risk. Also, 
further studies could control for information leakage over a longer period using long-term 
event study methodology such as the buy-and-hold method.   
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9. APPENDIX 
9.1 CALCULATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This sections discusses the technical methods and assumptions behind our thesis. 
Section 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 pertains to event studies, whilst 9.1.3 and 9.1.4 discusses cross 
sectional and logistic regressions, respectively.     
 
9.1.1 ABNORMAL RETURN MEASURES AND TEST STATISTICS 
 
Following we describe the technical treatment behind the univariate tests found in 
section 5.1. Several steps are required in order to estimate the cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR) and determine whether it is different across subsamples. First we show how 
the abnormal return (AR) is obtained for each security for each of the days in its event 
window and its corresponding variance. Second we show how we aggregate AR for a single 
event into a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) spanning the event window. Third we 
average all the CARs into CAAR, and find its test statistic. Fourth we show how we use a 
simple test of difference to discern whether the CAAR is different across subsamples.  
The notation used is primarily taken from Lim (2011). However all our methods 
surrounding event study, to the best of our knowledge, is considered standard event study 
methodology as described by Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay (1997) and Kothari & Warner 
(2007). We extend the use of estimates gathered from the event study by using them in a 
standard test of differences.  
 
Benchmark Model and the Abnormal Return 
In order to find the abnormal return due to an event, the movement due to normal 
circumstances must be filtered out. We use the market model as a benchmark model, defined 
as: 
 
rit  Di Eirmt eit  
where rit is the i’th event return on the t’th day of the event, with the event occurring at t=0. 
rmt denotes the market return (value weighted worldwide index from CRSP) at time t, α and β 
are standard OLS regression coefficients and e is the residual. We estimate the parameters of 
the market model using data starting 279 days prior to the event and ending 30 days prior, 
both days inclusive.  
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For the market model to be valid we make the following assumptions: 
1. 
 
cov(rmt,eit )  0 
2. 
 
var(eit )  Vi2, a constant  
3. 
 
cov(eit,eitk)  0 for 
 
k z 0 
 
The abnormal return is defined as the residual of the difference between the actual 
return and the expected return using the estimated parameters from the market model. We 
calculate an AR for each of the days in our larger event window, i.e. τ∈(-2,2). The ’hat’ 
above coefficients or variables denotes that it is the estimated value of the coefficient or 
predicted value of the variable using coefficients from the market model.  
 
 
ARiW  riW  ˆ riW  riW  ˆ Di  ˆ EirmW   
Our estimate of AR is dependant on the predicted return from the benchmark model, 
which itself is a random variable. Thus our estimate of AR is a random variable, with its 
distribution dependant on the statistical properties of the predicted return. More specifically 
the variance of our AR can be estimated by the variance of our estimate of
 
ˆ r 25 when L is 
large. This is calculated as follows: 
 
ˆ Vi2  
1
L 2 (rit 
ˆ Di  ˆ Eirmt )2
t L29
30
¦  1L 2 ˆ e it
2
t L29
30
¦  
Where L is the length of our event window (250 days), and the sum of the square of the 
difference is divided by the number of observations subtracted for 2 degrees of freedom 
correction.  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Next we aggregate the individual ARs for an event into a CAR for the whole of the 
event window of interest. The CAR is simply defined as the sum of all AR for an event in the 
event window with τ1 marking the start of the event window and τ2 marking the end: 
 
CARi(W1,W2)  ARiW
W W1
W2
¦  
The corresponding variance is defined as: 
                                                 
25 The precise expression for the variance of AR is as follows: 
 
var(ARit rmt )  V i2 1
1
L 
(rmt  r m )2
(rmt  r m )2t L29
30¦
§
©
¨
¨
·
¹
¸
¸
 
Which asymptotically converges to 
 
V i2. Lim (2011) recommends using 
 
V i2 as an approximation when L is 
“fairly large, e.g. L=240” (page 165). 
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 
var(CARi(W1,W2) rmWk ,...)  var(ARiW rmW ) |
W1
W2
¦ (W2 W1 1)V i2 
Due to assumption 3, the covariances between different AR for the same event all equal to 
zero and thus disappear. Furthermore due to assumption 2 we assume that the variance stays 
constant for an individual firm. We are therefore able to estimate the variance of the CAR as 
a sum of the individual variances.   
 
CAAR and its Test Statistic 
Next we aggregate the individual CARs into CAAR to test whether divestitures on 
average are associated with positive announcement returns. We define CAAR as the average 
CAR for all events in our sample, or for different subsamples of our sample. We define 
CAAR simply as:  
 
CAAR(W1,W2)  
1
N ARiWW W1
W2
¦
i 1
N
¦  1N CARi(i 1
N
¦ W1,W2)  
where N is the number of events in our sample. The corresponding variance is simply the 
variance of the average of the CARs. 
 
var(CAAR(W1,W2) rmtk ,...) |
1
N 2 (W2 W1 1)i 1
N
¦ V i2  
Under the null hypothesis the CAAR is distributed: 
 
CAAR(W1,W2) rmtk ,...| N(0,
1
N 2 (W2 W1 1)i 1
N
¦ V i2) 
We can thus test whether our resulting CAAR is statistically significantly different from zero 
by using the following:  
 
CAAR(W1,W2)
(W2 W1 1) ˆ Vi2
i 1
N
¦
N 2
| N(0,1)  
Which follows a standard normal distribution. We test whether our estimate is statistically 
significantly different from zero by adjusting our CAAR by its estimated standard error and 
comparing it to the Z-statistic. 
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Test Statistics of Difference, and the Difference of Differences 
Lastly we wish to test whether the difference in CAAR between two subsamples, 
such as large and small, is significantly different. We simply use a t-test as described by 
Stock & Watson (2010): 
 
t  (CAAR1 CAAR2)  d0SE(CAAR1 CAAR2)
 
Where d0 is the value of the difference under the null hypothesis. We use 0 exclusively as the 
value of the difference under the null hypothesis, and thus the term d0 disappears from all our 
tests. 
 
We define the standard error of the difference as follows  
 
)r(aˆv)r(aˆv,...)( 2121 CAARCAARrCAARCAARSE km   W  
2
2
1
2
112
2
1
1
2
112
21
ˆ)1(ˆ)1(
NN
N
i
i
N
i
i ¦¦
  



 
VWWVWW
 
Where we denote with subscript 1 for the first subsample and 2 for the second subsample. 
The resulting test statistic follows a student t distribution. However as all our values of N is 
large, it can be approximated by a standard normal distribution. We thus test our resulting t-
value to a standard normal distribution to determine the probability that it is generated by the 
random variable under the null hypothesis.  
 
9.1.2 ABSOLUTE RETURN MEASURE AND TEST STATISTIC 
 
The discussion so far has revolved around the percentage returns and its test statistics. 
Following we show how we translate the CAAR into the cumulative average abnormal dollar 
return (CAA$R) and its test statistic. We use simple algebraic alterations of standard event 
study methodology to construct our estimates of coefficients and standard errors. 
Our approach is to take the cumulative abnormal return and translate this into the 
cumulative abnormal dollar return. To do this we take the CAR(-1, 0) for each firm and 
multiply it with the market capitalization of the firm two days prior. We use closing price 
two days prior, as that is the latest point prior to the estimation window of the CAR. We then 
average the entire sample of cumulative abnormal dollar returns in order to find the CAA$R. 
It is defined as follows: 
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 
CAA$R  1N CARi(W1,W2) u MarketCapi(2)i 1
N
¦  
We simply scale the variance accordingly. It can be shown with some algebra26 that  
 
var(CAA$R) rmt ,...|
(W2 W1 1)
N 2 MarketCapi
2 uV i2
i 1
N
¦  
The values for the t-statistic are simply constructed as: 
 
t  CAA$R
vˆ ar(CAA$R)  
The test of differences are constructed simply as: 
 
t  (CAA$R1 CAA$R2)  d0SE(CAA$R1 CAA$R2)
 
where our hypothesized value of d0 is 0 and the SE is defined as: 
 
SE(CAA$R1 CAA$R2) rmWk ,... vˆ ar(CAA$R1) vˆ ar(CAA$R2)  
 
 
(W2 W1 1) MarketCapi2 u ˆ V1i2
i 1
N1
¦
N12

(W2 W1 1) MarketCapi2 u ˆ V2i2
i 1
N2
¦
N22
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The algebra: 
 
var(CAA$R) rmt ,... var(
1
N CARi u MarketCapii 1
N
¦ ) 
 
 1N 2 var( CARi u MarketCapii 1
N
¦ ), by taking out the constant 
 
1
N
 
 
 1N 2 vari 1
N
¦ (CARi u MarketCapi) , as all the covariances are zero by assumption 2 
 
 1N 2 MarketCapi
2 u var
i 1
N
¦ (CARi) , as given i, we can treat MarketCap as a constant 
 
| 1N 2 MarketCapi
2 u (W2 W1 1)V i2
i 1
N
¦ , substituting 
 
var(CARi) from earlier 
 
| (W2 W1 1)N 2 MarketCapi
2 uV i2
i 1
N
¦ , as 
 
(W2 W1 1) is a constant 
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9.1.3 CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS 
 
We use cross-sectional regressions in Stata to determine the effect of a range of 
variables on CAR. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used to estimate the 
coefficients, which limits the functional form to be linear in the coefficients but not in the 
variables (for instance the interaction of ‘not in financial distress’ and ‘large’ is non-linear in 
the base variables). We will not delve into the details of OLS, but rather refer to a standard 
econometric textbook such as Stock & Watson (2010) for calculations of the estimates of 
coefficients and residuals.  
The only addition we make to standard OLS regression is to use clustered standard 
errors utilizing the ivreg2 command in Stata due to Baum et al. (2007). We cluster on both 
two-digit-industry-SIC code and year-date, allowing us to control for any intra-group 
variation due to industry and year, as well as any heteroskedasticity. We use clustering on 
industry and month in reduced samples due to insufficient variation inter-group. The choice 
of the level that is clustered on is essentially a trade-off between bias and variance (Cameron 
& Miller, 2015), where larger clusters control better for intra-group variance, but increases 
the overall variance due to smaller number of clusters. 
 
9.1.4 LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
For regressions with a binary dependent variable, non-linear regression models that 
give predicted values between 0 and 1 are preferred to an OLS regression. In section 6.1, 
partial anticipation of future divestitures, we use logistic regressions to forecast the 
probability of a divestiture in a given year by a given firm.  
A logistic regression estimates the parameters by a log likelihood function. The 
logistic model takes the following form: 
 
Pr(Y  1X1,...)  
1
1 e(D E1X1 ...)  
where the estimates of the coefficients (i.e. β1,…) are interpreted as the effect of the 
independent variable on the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable.  
Due to the complexity of the intuitive interpretation of the coefficients, we utilise the 
margins command in Stata to calculate the marginal effect of each independent variable. The 
margins command calculates the marginal effect of a variable holding all the other variables 
constant at their mean value. As our functional form is non-linear, the marginal effect for a 
variable differs depending on the values of all the other independent variables. The predicted 
marginal effect is a ballpark measure rather than a precise marginal effect of the variable of 
interest. 
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9.2 VARIABLES 
9.2.1 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
VARIABLE UNIT DESCRIPTION  SOURCE 
 
Dependant variable 
   
Announcement 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (-1, 0) 
Percent Cumulative abnormal return (-1, 0 of the selling 
firm calculated using the market model. The stock 
return is adjusted for stock splits and dividends. 
The event beta is estimated using daily stock 
returns over a 250-day period ending 30 days 
before the event date. The market return is 
approximated using the CRSP value weighted 
world-wide index. We also include event 
windows (-1, 1) and (-2, 2). See 9.1 for the 
mathematical specifications.  
CRSP and 
SDC  
Firm size and deal value    
Firm Size  Log Log of market capitalization based on the closing 
price of the stock two days prior to the 
announcement  
CRSP and 
SDC 
Seller is Large Binary Dummy=1 if the divesting firm’s market 
capitalization two days prior to the announcement 
is greater than the 75th percentile of firms listed in 
the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX in a given year 
(and 0 otherwise). 
CRSP and 
SDC  
Dollar Return  Absolute    
($, millions) 
Percentage abnormal return (-1, 0) multiplied by 
the market capitalization two days prior to the 
announcement.  
CRSP and 
SDC 
Deal Value Absolute   
($, millions) 
Total value of the consideration (cash and other 
forms) payed to acquire the asset   
SDC  
Relative Deal Size Ratio Deal value divided by the market capitalization of 
the parent firm two days prior to the 
announcement.  
CRSP and 
SDC 
 
 
Corporate focus 
   
Number of Segments Absolute Total number of segments reported at the end of 
the year prior to the deal.  
Compustat 
Decrease in Segments Binary Dummy=1 if the number of segments decreased 
during the year of the divestiture (and 0 
otherwise). 
SDC and 
Compustat 
% Change in Segments Percent Percentage change in the number of segments 
during the year of the divestiture.  
SDC and 
Compustat 
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Herfindahl Index Index The sales based Herfindahl index one year prior to 
the event. Measure of focus on core business. 
Measured as the sum of squared sales for each 
segment divided by the square of the sum of sales 
for each segment.  
 
¦
¦ 2
2
)( i
i
esSegmentSal
esSegmentSalHerfindahl  
Compustat 
and SDC 
% Change in Herfindahl 
Index 
Percent Percentage change of the Herfindahl index during 
the year of the divestiture 
Compustat 
and SDC 
Increase in Herfindahl 
Index 
Binary Dummy=1 if there has been an increase in the 
Herfindal index during the year of the divestiture 
(and 0 otherwise). 
Compustat 
and SDC 
Fit with the Seller Binary Dummy=1 if the seller and the divested asset 
share the same two-digit SIC code.   
SDC 
Fit with the buyer    
Fit with the Buyer Binary Dummy=1 if the buyer and the acquired asset 
share the same two-digit SIC code (and 0 
otherwise). 
SDC 
 
LBO Group  Binary Dummy=1 if the buyer is classified as an LBO 
group in the SDC database (and 0 otherwise). 
SDC 
Agency issues    
Low Cash Binary Dummy=1 if the seller’s cash reserve relative to 
market capitalization is below the median value 
for firms within the same two-digit SIC industry 
as the seller (and 0 otherwise). 
SDC and 
Compustat 
Bank Debt Ratio Ratio Value of bank debt in the end of the previous year 
divided by market capitalization two days prior to 
the announcement. Bank debt is defined as “Debt 
in current liabilities” minus “debt in one year”. 
(see Hirschey et al., 1990)  
SDC and 
Compustat 
CEO ownership Percent Percent of total common stocks outstanding 
owned by the CEO of the selling firm at the end 
of the year prior to the announcement.  
SDC and 
Compustat 
(Execucom
p)  
Long Term 
Compensation Plan  
Binary Dummy=1 if the selling firm has a long-term 
compensation plan in place for the CEO. Long-
term compensation plans are non-stock 
compensation tied to long-term performance (and 
0 otherwise). 
SDC and 
Compustat 
(Execucom
p) 
Firm Deal Order 
Number 
Absolute Past number of deals plus one completed by the 
firm since 1995.   
SDC 
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CEO Deal Order 
Number 
Absolute Past number of deals plus one completed by the 
incumbent CEO for the given firm  
SDC and 
Compustat 
(Execucom
p) 
Hubris Binary Dummy=1 if the CEO is hubristic during the year 
of the divestiture (and 0 otherwise). See 9.2.1 for 
the definition of CEO hubris 
SDC, 
Compustat 
and CRSP 
Multiple Seller Binary Dummy=1 if the Firm Deal Order Number is 
greater than one (and 0 otherwise). 
SDC 
Financial distress    
Finical distress Binary Dummy=1 if the parent of the divested asset is in 
financial distress at the end of the year prior to the 
divestiture, as measured by Altman’s Z score (and 
0 otherwise). See 9.2.2 for the description of the 
Z-score.  
SDC and 
Compustat 
Logistic regression    
Number of Past 
Divestitures by the Firm 
Absolute The number of past divestitures completed by the 
seller at any given year27 
SDC 
Number of Past 
Divestitures by the Firm 
Absolute The number of past divestitures completed by the 
incumbent CEO after a three year dormant period 
at any given year between 1995 and 2014 
SDC and 
Compustat 
Tobin’s Q Ratio Calculated as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
 
Compustat 
Market Return previous 
year 
Percent Yearly market return the previous year. Market 
return is the value weighted world-wide CRSP 
index. 
CRSP 
Hubris Binary Dummy=1 if the CEO is hubristic during the year 
of the divestiture (and 0 otherwise). See 9.2.1 for 
the definition of CEO hubris 
SDC, 
Compustat 
and CRSP 
Stock Return previous 
year 
Percent Yearly stock return of the firm the previous year CRSP 
Total Number of 
Acquisitions in the 
market 
Absolute Total number of acquisitions reported in the SDC 
database during a given year 
SDC 
                                                 
27 Firm Deal Order Number is different as it measures the deal order number of a given deal, whereas Number 
of Past Divestitures measure the number of past deals made by the firm at any given year between 1995 and 
2014.  
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Total Number of 
Acquisitions in the 
industry 
Absolute Total number of acquisitions reported in the SDC 
database within the same two-digit SIC industry 
as the firm  
SDC 
Abnormal return of the 
previous divestiture 
Percent Cumulative abnormal return at the announcement 
of the previous deal completed by the seller 
SDC and 
CRSP 
CEO change previous 
year 
Binary Dummy=1 if the seller replaced the CEO during 
the previous year  
SDC and 
COMPUST
AT 
 
9.2.2 HUBRIS PROXY 
 
We define the CEO as hubristic if three cumulative conditions are fulfilled (see Aktas, et al., 
2011): (1) The CEO has been employed as CEO for at least 12 months at the announcement 
of the divestiture. (2) The CEO has been a net inside purchaser of common stocks during 12 
months preceding the divestiture. (3) The average abnormal return (-1, 0) at the 
announcement of quarterly earnings during 12 months preceding the divestiture is below the 
median value for the market. The hubris variable hence takes the value 1 if these three 
conditions are satisfied and 0 otherwise. The methodology used for calculating abnormal 
returns at the announcement of quarterly earnings is the same as for the announcement of 
divestitures.  
 
9.2.3 Z-SCORE FOR FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 
We use the Z-score models as described by Altman (1983). We use separate 
calculations for manufacturers and non-manufacturers, identifying manufacturers as those 
with SIC codes between 2000 and 3999. The Z score for manufacturers is calculated as 
follows:  
54321 0.16.03.34.12.1 XXXXXZ   
Where: 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities  
X5 = Sales/Total Assets  
We use the cut-off of 1.81, which is the lower bound where all firms scoring below 1.81 in 
Altman’s (1983) original sample became bankrupt within two years. 
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The Z’’ score model pertains to non-manufacturers. We use the Z’’ score model to 
identify financially distressed non-manufacturing firms. The model is as follows: 
 
Z' ' 6.56X1  3.26X2 6.72X3 1.05X4  
The Xi refers to the corresponding variable in the previous model. Parallel to the Z score 
model, we use the lower bound of 1.1 as cut-off for financial distress (Hayes et al, 2010).  
 
9.3 DATA POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Table 9.3.1 
Data population and sample selection in the period 1995 to 2014: 
Year   
Total 
transactions Divestitures US divestitures Public US divestitures Sample 
Sample/Total 
divestitures 
1995   7957 2574 1096 708 322 12.5% 
1996   9301 2955 1281 849 397 13.4% 
1997   10967 3690 1547 950 403 10.9% 
1998   11858 3828 1498 970 438 11.4% 
1999   12272 3885 1248 930 392 10.1% 
2000   13211 3860 1276 914 438 11.3% 
2001   9625 3263 1073 792 365 11.2% 
2002   8724 3148 1156 830 363 11.5% 
2003   9558 3526 1217 828 365 10.4% 
2004   10562 3651 1169 732 366 10.0% 
2005   11927 3952 1327 802 392 9.9% 
2006   13201 4099 1364 797 390 9.5% 
2007   15026 4453 1384 832 360 8.1% 
2008   12920 3779 1029 630 294 7.8% 
2009   11035 3506 857 573 228 6.5% 
2010   11429 3816 904 476 220 5.8% 
2011   11502 3778 936 478 204 5.4% 
2012   10897 3733 1011 531 241 6.5% 
2013   9911 3539 984 553 259 7.3% 
2014   11305 3838 1071 553 262 6.8% 
Total   223188 72873 23428 14728 6699 9.2% 
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9.4 VIF TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable VIF  Variable VIF 
Table 5.5 Regression (1): Persistence of the size effect    Table 5.4. Regression (1): Relative Deal Size   
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and low 
cash 2.44  Log market capitalization 1.11 
Dummy=1 if low cash 2.13  Relative deal size 1.11 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed 1.47  Mean VIF 1.11 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 1.42    
Bank debt ratio 1.29  Table 5.4. Regression (2): Relative Deal Size   
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile 1.19  Relative Deal size 1.05 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 1.11  Dummy=1 if 4
th quartile 1.05 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer 1.1  Mean VIF 1.05 
CEO deal order number 1.09    
Long-term compensation ratio 1.08  Table 6.1. Regression (3): Logistic regression   
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash 1.07  Number of M&A deals in US year prior 20.13 
CEO ownership 1.05  Log market capitalization year prior 17.95 
Relative deal size 1.04  Dummy=1 if CEO change same year as the deal 3.29 
Dummy=1 if decrease in focus 1.03  Dummy=1 if CEO change year prior to deal  3.28 
Mean VIF 1.32  Number of M&A deals in industry year prior 2.18 
   Cash-assets ratio year prior 1.9 
Table 5.5 Regression (3): Persistence of the size effect    Number of past divestitures by the CEO* 1.68 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and low 
cash 2.44  S&P 500 market return year prior 1.31 
Dummy=1 if low cash 2.13  Dummy=1 if CEO is hubristic year prior 1.3 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed 1.47  Stock return year prior 1.23 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 1.42  Dummy=1 if Financial distress year prior 1.23 
Bank debt ratio 1.29  Tobins Q 1.1 
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile 1.26  Abnormal return of previous deal 1.04 
Relative deal size 1.15  Mean VIF 4.43 
Dummy=1 if 3rd quartile 1.14    
CEO ownership 1.12    
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 1.12     
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer 1.1     
CEO deal order number 1.09     
Long-term compensation ratio 1.09     
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash 1.08     
Dummy=1 if 2nd quartile 1.07     
Dummy=1 if decrease in focus 1.03     
Average 1.3125     
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9.5 ALTERNATIVE EVENT WINDOWS 
 
9.5.1 RELATIVE DEAL SIZE (-1, 1) 
 
Table 9.5.1 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm size and relative deal size. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Log market capitalization 
 
-0.378***    -0.290***  -0.326*** 
Dummy=1 if seller is large 
 
 -1.684***  -0.860***  -1.971***  
Relative deal size 
 
0.950** 1.060** 0.941** 0.941** 2.029** 0.982** 0.0420 
1st quartile 
 
  2.973*** 2.113**    
2nd quartile 
 
  1.955*** 1.095**    
3rd qaurtile 
 
  0.860***     
Relative Size Squared 
 
    -0.0519*   
Seller is large x Relative 
deal size 
 
     3.475***  
Log market cap. x 
Relative deal size 
 
      0.534*** 
_cons 4.094*** 2.217*** 0.542*** 1.401*** 3.205*** 2.263*** 3.343*** 
N 6699 6699 6699 6699 6699 6699 6699 
R2 0.029 0.027 0.030 0.030 0.034 0.030 0.040 
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9.5.2 RELATIVE DEAL SIZE (-2, 2) 
 
Table 9.5.2 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm size and relative deal size. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Log market capitalization 
 
-0.395***    -0.269***  -0.350*** 
Dummy=1 if seller is large 
 
 -1.549***  -0.744***  -1.969***  
Relative deal size 
 
1.155** 1.297*** 1.140** 1.140** 2.724*** 1.171** -0.123 
1st quartile 
 
  3.215*** 2.471***    
2nd quartile 
 
  1.513*** 0.769    
3rd qaurtile 
 
  0.744***     
Relative Size Squared 
 
    -0.0813**   
Seller is large x Relative 
deal size 
 
     5.018***  
Log market cap. x 
Relative deal size 
 
      0.644*** 
_cons 4.318*** 2.213*** 0.675*** 1.418*** 3.037*** 2.286*** 3.582*** 
N 6693 6693 6693 6693 6693 6693 6693 
R2 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.030 0.038 0.033 0.041 
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9.5.3 PERSISTENCE OF THE SIZE EFFECT (-1, 1) 
 
Table 9.5.3 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures:     
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile -1.033   -0.630 
Log market capitalization  -0.408**   
Dummy=1 if 1st quartile   2.697 2.067 
Dummy=1 if 2nd quartile   2.012 1.382 
Dummy=1 if 3rd quartile   0.630  
     
Relative deal size 1.769*** 1.698*** 1.706*** 1.706*** 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in focus 0.525 0.473 0.541 0.541 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer -0.191 -0.140 -0.191 -0.191 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 0.434 0.474 0.402 0.402 
Dummy=1 if low cash -1.877*** -2.076*** -1.883*** -1.883*** 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed -0.772 -0.617 -0.692 -0.692 
Bank debt ratio -0.0478** -0.0479** -0.0464* -0.0464* 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 0.00490 0.0217 0.00301 0.00301 
CEO ownership -0.00390 -0.00857* -0.00744 -0.00744 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash 0.00806 0.00964 0.0138 0.0138 
Long-term compensation ratio -0.0145* -0.00560 -0.0128 -0.0128 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and low 
cash 
0.136** 0.167*** 0.136** 0.136** 
CEO deal order number -0.0248 0.00345 -0.0278 -0.0278 
     
constant 2.954*** 5.403** 1.861** 2.491*** 
N 912 912 912 912 
adj. R2 0.110 0.116 0.111 0.111 
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9.5.4 PERSISTENCE OF THE SIZE EFFECT (-2, 2) 
 
Table 9.5.4 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures:     
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile -1.201   -0.475 
Log market capitalization  -0.408**   
Dummy=1 if 1st quartile   2.697 2.067 
Dummy=1 if 2nd quartile   2.012 1.382 
Dummy=1 if 3rd quartile   0.475  
     
Relative deal size 1.778*** 1.692*** 1.660*** 1.660*** 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in focus 0.808 0.743 0.837* 0.837* 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer -0.155 -0.0939 -0.156 -0.156 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 0.832 0.883 0.772 0.772 
Dummy=1 if low cash -2.300*** -2.537*** -2.313*** -2.313*** 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed -1.009 -0.820 -0.864 -0.864 
Bank debt ratio 0.0268 0.0271 0.0294 0.0294 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash -0.0911 -0.0712 -0.0946 -0.0946 
CEO ownership 0.00220 -0.00343 -0.00440 -0.00440 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash 0.0168 0.0185 0.0274 0.0274 
Long-term compensation ratio -0.0174 -0.00654 -0.0142 -0.0142 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and low 
cash 
0.204*** 0.242*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
CEO deal order number -0.0405 -0.00604 -0.0460 -0.0460 
     
constant 3.443*** 6.388*** 2.137** 2.611** 
N 912 912 912 912 
adj. R2 0.110 0.118 0.117 0.117 
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9.5.5 EFFECT OF CHARACTERISTICS ON ABNORMAL RETURN (-1, 1) 
 
Table 9.5.5 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures     
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile -1.029  -1.252 -0.815 
Log market capitalization  -0.354   
     
Relative deal size 1.757*** 0.393* 1.745*** 1.775*** 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in segments 0.220 -3.788 0.394  
Dummy=1 if increase in Herfindahl    1.566 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer 0.182 -0.854 0.165 0.0171 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 0.625 -1.518 0.595 0.555 
Dummy=1 if low cash -1.846*** -2.116*** -1.028*** -1.777*** 
Bank debt ratio -0.0421 -0.0391 -0.0317 -0.0455* 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash 0.0199 0.0389  0.0227 
CEO ownership -0.00170 0.00279 -0.00273 -0.0000820 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash 0.00821 0.00202  0.0139 
Long-term compensation ratio -0.0129 -0.00382 -0.00648 -0.0135* 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and 
low cash 
0.142** 0.183***  0.133** 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed -0.0952 2.302 0.223 -0.258 
CEO deal order number -0.169 -0.529 -0.180 -0.250 
     
Interaction with 4th quartile size     
Seller is large x relative deal size 6.558***  6.617*** 6.679*** 
Seller is large x decrease in segments 0.0134  -0.163  
Seller is large x Herfindahl    -1.647 
Seller is large x Fit with buyer -0.335  -0.327 -0.177 
Seller is large x LBO buyer -0.0812  -0.110 0.0195 
Seller is large x not financial distressed -0.891  -0.506 -0.680 
Seller is large x CEO deal order number 0.162  0.186 0.244 
     
Interaction with log market cap.     
Log market cap. x relative deal size  0.793***   
Log market cap. x decrease in segments  0.452   
Log market cap. x Fit with buyer  0.0977   
Log market cap. x LBO buyer  0.206   
Log market cap. x not financial distressed  -0.360   
Log market cap. x CEO deal order number  0.0549   
     
constant 2.625 4.786 2.177 2.413 
N 912 912 912 912 
adj. R2 0.117 0.139 0.116 0.120 
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9.5.6 EFFECT OF CHARACTERISTICS ON ABNORMAL RETURN (-2, 2) 
 
Table 9.5.6 
Cross sectional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on firm and deal characteristics. 
One, two and three stars represent 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 CAR1 
Size measures     
Dummy=1 if 4th quartile -1.370  -1.627 -1.051 
Log market capitalization  -0.255   
     
Relative deal size 1.775*** 0.379 1.757*** 1.800*** 
     
Firm and deal characteristics:     
Dummy=1 if decrease in segments 0.659 -1.451 0.937  
Dummy=1 if increase in Herfindahl    2.208 
Dummy=1 if fit with the buyer 0.722 1.110 0.677 0.510 
Dummy=1 if buyer is LBO group 2.097 1.844 2.045 2.026 
Dummy=1 if low cash -2.231*** -2.551*** -1.092*** -2.137*** 
Bank debt ratio 0.0385 0.0341 0.0323 0.0366 
Bank debt ratio x not distressed and low cash -0.0728 -0.0468  -0.0725 
CEO ownership 0.00630* 0.0113* 0.00527 0.00847** 
CEO ownership x not distressed and low cash 0.0227 0.0113  0.0307 
Long-term compensation ratio -0.0161 -0.00746 -0.00715 -0.0163 
Long-term compensation ratio x not distressed and 
low cash 
0.209*** 0.263***  0.197*** 
Dummy=1 if not financially distressed -0.315 3.316 0.146 -0.515 
CEO deal order number -0.414* -0.933** -0.424* -0.530** 
     
Interaction with 4th quartile size     
Seller is large x relative deal size 9.097***  9.211*** 9.302*** 
Seller is large x decrease in segments -0.398  -0.668  
Seller is large x Herfindahl    -2.475* 
Seller is large x Fit with buyer -0.954  -0.938 -0.755 
Seller is large x LBO buyer -1.340  -1.366 -1.222 
Seller is large x not financial distressed -1.027  -0.545 -0.774 
Seller is large x CEO deal order number 0.412  0.439* 0.530** 
     
Interaction with log market cap.     
Log market cap. x relative deal size  0.823***   
Log market cap. x decrease in segments  0.198   
Log market cap. x Fit with buyer  -0.128   
Log market cap. x LBO buyer  -0.136   
Log market cap. x not financial distressed  -0.535   
Log market cap. x CEO deal order number  0.0968***   
     
constant 3.233 4.500 2.606 2.963 
N 912 912 912 912 
adj. R2 0.133 0.149 0.128 0.139 
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9.6 MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
Table 9.5.6 
 Marginal effects from logistic regression 6.1.  
  Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (2) 
  dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z 
Number of past divestitures by the firm 0.0129 10.35 -0.0015 -0.93     
Number of past divestitures by the CEO     0.0423 16.36 0.0376 16.21 
Dummy=1 if CEO change same year as the deal 0.0574 5.34 0.0581 5.46 0.0465 3.94 
Dummy=1 if CEO change year prior to deal  -0.0059 -0.57 0.0023 0.23 0.0013 0.11 
Dummy=1 if Financial distress year prior 0.1015 7.75 0.0864 6.65 0.0749 4.94 
Log market capitalization year prior 0.0232 7.81 0.0206 6.96 0.0192 5.60 
Abnormal return previous divestiture -0.0907 -1.10 -0.0770 -0.96 -0.1107 -1.19 
Dummy=1 if CEO is hubristic year prior         0.0303 2.46 
              
Tobins Q -0.0003 -0.19 -0.0003 -0.22 -0.0029 -0.54 
S&P 500 market return year prior 0.3233 11.37 0.3071 10.90 0.2754 8.58 
Stock return year prior -0.0738 -6.55 -0.0764 -6.73 -0.0745 -5.46 
Cash-assets ratio year prior -0.0652 -1.82 -0.0400 -1.13 -0.0616 -1.33 
Number of M&A deals in US year prior 0.0000 -4.16 0.0000 -4.15 0.0000 -3.10 
Number of M&A deals in industry year prior 0.0000 0.06 0.0000 -0.10 0.0000 -0.45 
 
